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Abstract
The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria was the world’s deadliest terrorist group of 2014,
second deadliest in 2015, and is one of the most perplexing terrorist groups to arise in the past 50
years. This study sought to identify how Boko Haram rose to power in Nigeria, and found the
following factors to be explanatory: Nigeria’s weak state capacity stemming from colonialism
and poor post-colonial governance, the politicization of religion, and Boko Haram’s relationship
with other terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabab, Al-Qaeda, and Daesh. This study further
analyzed domestic and international responses to Boko Haram, up to present day, and made
policy recommendations to counter the group.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“Do African lives matter? There’s rarely a protest when we hear that Africans have been killed
on the continent of Africa. There’s rarely a protest every single day when we hear that Boko
Haram is killing people. We get protests in front of the State Department all the time – protesting
all kinds of human rights violations. Protest people being killed on the continent by terrorists.
We all need to hear the voices of the people. Ordinary men and women in Africa, the United
States, and abroad need to raise their voices and send an unmistakable message that Boko
Haram’s violence is intolerable, and it’s unacceptable. The outcry in Nigeria and internationally
over the kidnapping of the Chibok school girls was impressive – but it was slow. We waited to
hear what people would say. Those protests, once they started, helped greatly to raise awareness
of Boko Haram’s brutality. But they were only a start.”1
- Linda Thomas-Greenfield
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs
February 9, 2016

As stated above, Nigeria and the world must do more. While we continue to focus on
Daesh2 in the Middle East, Boko Haram has become smarter, more efficient, and so deadly that
in 2015, they had the second highest death toll of all terrorist groups since 2000.3 Yet, the world
is largely silent.
In response to the preceding claims, many would argue that Boko Haram is a domestic
problem, not an international one. However, I would contend that while Boko Haram itself may
indeed be more of a regional problem, the effects it has on the Nigerian population are anything
but. With their increasing use of child soldiers, disdain for human life, geographic spread into
Cameroon and Niger, and creation of famine in Northeast Nigeria, the time has come where the
world can no longer turn a blind eye to the atrocities being carried out by Boko Haram. At the
very least, the group warrants further studying, which is exactly what this thesis will do.

1

The Bureau of African Affairs is an office within the U.S. Department of State (Linda ThomasGreenfield, “Boko Haram and Its Regional Impact,” Speech transcript, The Capitol Visitor Center, U.S.
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. February 9, 2016).
2
Daesh will be the name utilized throughout this thesis to reference The Islamic State (ISIS).
3
Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index of 2016: Measuring and Understanding the
Impact of Terrorism, Report no. 43, November 2016: 47.
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Why Nigeria?
In addition to being the country where Boko Haram originated, Nigeria plays an
incredibly important role on the African continent, as well as the world stage. To better
understand Boko Haram, it is first necessary to understand Nigeria as a state.
With a population of over 186 million,4 Nigeria is not only the most populous country in
Africa, but also the seventh most populous country in the entire world.5 This “giant of Africa”6 is
the single-most rapidly growing country and is projected to grow at a rate of 7.9% to 411 million
inhabitants by 2050.7 This would lead Nigeria to surpass the United States as the world’s third
most populous country.
Nigeria has another important role in Africa, as it is one of the few countries that are key
to the continent’s stability.8 Politically, Nigeria is one of the founding members of the African
Union9 and contributes “large numbers of troops to the [United Nations],”10 making them a
regional leader. Consequently, the country has the largest economy in Africa,11 making them a
vital member of the “Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS].”12 Nigeria’s
economic success is largely due to the country’s position as an international oil giant, which
constitutes virtually all government revenue. Because it is their main export,13 when oil prices
fell worldwide and the United States and other countries decreased the amount of oil they were
4

United Nations, “Nigeria,” UN data, last modified 2017,
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=NIGERIA.
5
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population
Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables, Report no. ESA/P/WP/248.
6
Aderibigbe Victor, “Is Nigeria still the ‘giant of Africa’?” The Guardian (Nigeria), last modified
September 11, 2017, https://guardian.ng/opinion/is-nigeria-still-the-giant-of-africa/.
7
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
8
South Africa and Kenya are two other countries that are key players on the continent.
9
John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (Updated Edition): vii.
10
Ibid.
11
“U.S. Relations With Nigeria,” U.S. Department of State, last modified February 21, 2017,
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm.
12
Campbell, 2013, vii.
13
“U.S. Relations With Nigeria.”
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importing from Nigeria,14 the country spun into an economic recession, which they only recently
came out of.
Why Boko Haram?
According to the Global Terrorism Index, Boko Haram was the most dangerous terrorist
group in the world in 201415 and was the second deadliest group in 2015.16 Despite their first
large-scale attack being carried out in 2009, the group has the second highest death toll out of all
terrorist groups since 2000 (15,600 people).17 Make no mistake, the magnitude of the above
statement cannot be stressed enough; the only group more deadly than Boko Haram is the
Taliban,18 which came into existence over a decade before Boko Haram. Thus, Boko Haram has
carried out an unprecedented level of violence in their 16 years of existence. To further put this
in perspective, in 2015 alone, the group killed over 5,478 people and averaged 11 deaths per
attack.19 Perhaps most disturbing is the fact that “four out of five [deaths by Boko Haram] are
civilians,” making this the “highest targeting of civilians anywhere in the world.”20 In contrast,
civilian targeting by Daesh and Al-Qaeda is two out of four.21 To emphasize this point, some of
Boko Haram’s deadliest attacks are listed below.22

14

The United States used to be Nigeria’s largest oil importer. Other countries, including Japan, China,
and Peru, have completely stopped importing oil from the country (Roseline Okere, “Nigeria loses crude
oil export destination to U.S.,” The Guardian (London, UK), March 30, 2017,
https://guardian.ng/business-services/nigeria-loses-crude-oil-export-destination-to-u-s/).
15
Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index of 2015, 4.
16
Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index of 2016, 4.
17
Ibid, 27.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid, 16.
20
Ibid, 27.
21
Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index of 2016: 27.
22
It is difficult for Americans and the American media to truly understand the severity of Boko Haram’s
attacks in Nigeria because of the “lack of reliable [reporting]” in Nigeria. (Maiangwa,, et.al, “‘Baptism by
Fire’”: Boko Haram and the Reign of Terror in Nigeria,” Africa Today 59 (2012): 2).
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Table 1: Boko Haram’s Deadliest Attacks
Year

Attack

Death Toll

January 20, 2012

Two vehicle-borne IED’s were detonated in Kano,
Nigeria.23

200+

April 14, 201424

Chibok School Girls: Over 276 girls were kidnapped from a
Boarding School in the Northeast Nigerian town of Chibok.
This was Boko Haram’s most notorious abduction case, as
it garnered international attention and created a worldwide
social movement called “#BringBackOurGirls.” In June
2017, the Nigerian Government reached a deal with the
group, which freed over 100 of the Chibok girls.25

Unknown

January 3-7, 201526

Baga Massacre: Boko Haram carried out a series of killings
and destroyed 16 villages in Northeast Nigeria. It is one of
the deadliest attacks Nigeria has ever experienced.27

Estimated to be
around 2,000.28

April 23, 2015

Boko Haram opened fire in the village of Kukuwa-Gair. It
was the seventh most fatal terrorist attack in 2015.29

174+

July 28, 2017

While searching for oil, Boko Haram ambushed a group of
people in Northeast Nigeria.30

40+

By the end of 2015, Boko Haram had spread from three to five countries (Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria),31 showing that the group was becoming more “audacious,

23

Ibid, 48.
“Nigeria Chibok abductions: What we know,” BBC News, last modified May 8, 2017,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32299943.
25
"”More than 40' killed in battle with Boko Haram in Nigeria,” BBC News, last modified July 28, 2017,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40740323.
26
Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index of 2015: 41.
27
It is impossible to definitively say how many people were killed in the attack, due to contradictory
reporting out of Nigeria (Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index of 2016, 50).
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid, 12.
30
Yemisi Adegoke, “UN: Half of world's population growth is likely to occur in Africa,” CNN Africa
View, last modified June 25, 2017.
31
Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index of 2016, 53.
24
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sophisticated, and coordinated over time.”32 The immediate result of this spread was a 157%
increase in terrorism-related deaths in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger,33 which offset the 34%
decrease in attacks in Nigeria that year.34 This increase was particularly seen in Cameroon and
Niger, which moved up to #13 and #16 as the most terror-afflicted states in the world.35 Thus,
despite setbacks occurring in their home state of Nigeria, the group has demonstrated its
resilience and has continued to wreak havoc.
In addition to spreading to other countries, Boko Haram had another major development
in 2015: a pledge of allegiance to Daesh. In this pledge, Boko Haram’s leader at the time,
Abubukar Shekau, declared Boko Haram to be the “Islamic State’s West African Province.”36
This “demonstrated to followers the seriousness of Boko Haram’s message,”37 which was further
solidified when Daesh’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, accepted the pledge that same month. As
months passed, it was unclear as to whether the pledge actually affected any of Boko Haram’s
actions. It later surfaced that the pledge may have splintered the group, due to a disagreement
over leadership. This resulted in Daesh claiming to have symbolically replaced Abubekar
Shekau, due to his indiscriminate killing of Nigerian Muslims. However, the reality is that we
don’t really know the extent of the relationship between the two. What we do know is that in
2014, Daesh and Boko Haram accounted for 51% of terrorist related deaths in the world38 and in
2015, four groups were responsible for 74% of terrorism related deaths worldwide: Daesh, Boko

32

Maiangwa, et al., “‘Baptism by Fire,” 41.
Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index of 2016, 20.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid, 2.
36
Boko Haram: The Islamist Insurgency In West Africa: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 114th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(2016)(statement of Representative Ted Poe, Chairman): 2.
37
Zacharias P. Pieri, and Jacob Zenn. “The Boko Haram Paradox: Ethnicity, Religion, and Historical
Memory in Pursuit of a Caliphate,” African Security 9, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 67.
38
Ibid.
33
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Haram, The Taliban, and Al-Qaeda.39 Thus, even if the relationship between Boko Haram and
Daesh is tenuous, it is cause for serious concern.40
Not surprisingly, Boko Haram’s attacks have had dramatic effects on Nigeria and its
population. To begin, they have created mass food insecurity in the Northeast portion of the
country. As a result, in January of 2017, the United Nations called for “1.05 billion dollars to
reach 6.9 billion people in Northeast Nigeria.”41 The following month, they warned that this area
was on the brink of famine and that food shortages were affecting 11 million Nigerians (5.5
million being children).42 By mid 2017, the United Nations had received $660.7 million dollars,
which was 62.7% of their overall goal.43
Since 2009, Boko Haram has also caused over 2 million people to become internally
displaced.44 From Northeast Nigeria alone (Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States), over 1.6 million
people, 1 million of them being children, were displaced.45 These statistics indicate that Boko
Haram has significantly increased the number of Nigerian children in conflict. Even worse, their
increasing use of children, particularly girls, as suicide bombers has become one of their most
common tactics.46 These actions are not only abhorrent, but a blatant violation of the
international norms put in place by the United Nations for protecting children during armed
39

Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index of 2016, 3.
Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index of 2015, 4.
41
Amy Harrison, “Nigeria’s food crisis: by the time famine is declared, it's too late," The Guardian
(London, UK), last modified June 12, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/global-developmentprofessionals-network/2017/jun/12/nigeria-food-crisis-un-response.
42
Michelle Faul, “UN: 120,000 Nigerians likely face Boko Haram-created famine,” U.S. News, last
modified February 8, 2017, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-02-08/un-120-000nigerian-likely-face-boko-haram-created-famine.
43
“Nigeria,” OHCA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), 2017,
http://www.unocha.org/nigeria.
44
Nelly Ating, “They survived Boko Haram, now returnees are fighting hunger,” CNN Africa View, last
modified July 18, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/africa/boko-haram-survivors-hunger/index.html.
45
“Northeast Nigeria Crisis Response End of Year Factsheet,” Infographic, UNICEF, 2016,
https://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/UNICEF_Nigeria_Factsheet_30_Sept_2016.pdf.
46
UNICEF Nigeria, Beyond Chibok: Over 1.3 million children uprooted by Boko Haram violence, by
Laurent Duvillier, 2015: 2.
40
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conflict.47 The actions that constitute a violation of this norm include killing or maiming
children, recruiting kids as child soldiers, rape and other sexual violence, abduction, attacks on
schools/hospitals, and any denial of humanitarian access.48 Unsurprisingly, Boko Haram has, and
continues to, actively utilize each of these tactics to terrorize Nigeria. Yet another way that Boko
Haram has targeted children is through education, or lack thereof. Due to their adversarial
approach to Western education and their stronghold in Northeast Nigeria,49 the state is suffering
from “mass illiteracy.”50 This problem is so severe that in December of 2016, UNICEF reported
that only 18% of school-aged children in the Northeast attended temporary learning spaces and
schools.51
Finally, Boko Haram has increased sectarian conflict in Nigeria, particularly between the
North (predominately Muslim) and the South (predominately Christian). This increase can partly
be attributed to Boko Haram’s labeling of Southern Nigeria as “one of its adversaries because
that area facilitates the spread of Western civilization in the country.”52 As a result, they have
vowed a “reign of terror on southern Nigeria.”53

47

The United Nations Security Council put these specific violations in place in 2009 (United Nations
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict,
International Legal Foundations of the Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict,
October 2009).
48
Ibid.
49
Aghedo Iro, and Osumah Oarhe, “Bread Not Bullets: Boko Haram And Insecurity Management In
Northern Nigeria,” African Study Monographs, 35 (December 2014): 219.
50
Ibid, 205.
51
“Northeast Nigeria Crisis Response End of Year Factsheet.”
52
Maiangwa, et al., “‘Baptism by Fire,’” 46.
53
Ibid.
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Thesis Overview
It is clear that Boko Haram is not just a Nigerian fight, but a global one.54 With their
heinous attacks and radical ideology, the group not only threatens regional stability, but
continental and global stability as well.
Furthermore, Boko Haram defies the stereotype that the United States tends to attribute to
terrorism, which involves a specific religion (Islam) and region of the world (the Middle East).
While it is true that Boko Haram claims to carry out their attacks in the name of Islam,55 their
rise in West Africa exemplifies the susceptibility of states to terrorism. And while steps can be
taken to fight terrorism, no state can entirely eradicate or prevent it, which is why we must
observe how these groups arise around the world.
This thesis does that and more by analyzing the factors that contributed to the rise of
Boko Haram in Nigeria, tracking domestic and international responses to the group, and creating
policy recommendations to counter the group. By studying these topics, Nigeria will be better
able to identify, thwart, and address the systemic causes of terrorism in the country. Ultimately,
it is this researcher’s hope that future terrorist groups in Nigeria can be stopped before becoming
another Boko Haram.

54

Linda Thomas-Greenfield.
Boko Haram does not represent Islam or its million of peaceful, Muslim adherents. As President
George W. Bush stated days after the September 11th attack on the United States of America, “The face of
terror is not the true faith of Islam. That's not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don't
represent peace. They represent evil and war. When we think of Islam we think of a faith that brings
comfort to a billion people around the world. Billions of people find comfort and solace and peace. And
that’s made brothers and sisters out of every race -- out of every race” (President George W. Bush, "Islam
is Peace," News release, September 17, 2001).

55
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Methodology
This thesis is primarily qualitative56 and utilizes the case study method57 to analyze the
origins of Boko Haram in Nigeria and provide policy domestic and international policy
recommendations. The state of Nigeria is studied in its entirety with the intention of figuring out
why Boko Haram emerged in the country and what contributed to its stronghold in the Northeast
region. To do so, the following factors are analyzed: the state capacity of Nigeria, the
politicization of religion, and Boko Haram’s relationship with prominent international terrorist
groups, specifically Daesh, Al-Shabab, and Al-Qaeda. These factors ultimately speak to
Nigeria’s ability to respond to domestic problems. This data was acquired and accumulated
through academic literature, The Global Terrorism Index (2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017), media
sources, NGO reports, as well as domestic and international government documents.
A case study was chosen for a multitude of reasons. First, it allows for the in-depth study
of a specific case, while actively avoiding oversimplification and inaccurate generalizations. It
does so by focusing on “in-depth inquiry over coverage: understanding ‘the case’ rather than
generalizing to a population at large.”58 This approach is necessary since this thesis is not meant
to be generalizable to every terrorist group. At most, it would provide narrow generalizations59
for other terrorist groups in Nigeria, which are contingent on some “shared key characteristics as
the [case being] studied.”60 Second, Nigeria is the state where Boko Haram originated and gained

56

Qualitative research is defined as “empirical research where the data [is] not [solely] in the form of
numbers” (Keith Punch, Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 2nd
ed., N.p., 2005, 3).
57
A case study is defined as studying one, or multiple, cases in great detail using a variety of methods
with the general objective to develop “as full an understanding of that case as possible” (Punch 2005,
144).
58
Bridget Somekh and Cathy Lewin. Research Methods in the Social Sciences, 2005, 33.
59
Alexander L. George, and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences, N.p., 2004, 22.
60
Ibid, 25.
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power. By 2015, “nearly 90% of the 15,600 deaths by Boko Haram”61 were located in Nigeria,
which made the state the third most affected state by terrorism that year.62 By solely and
extensively studying Nigeria, a better understanding can arise as to why Boko Haram rose in that
state and not another. The final reason for the case study method is because it allows for specific
policy prescriptions to be put forward, which can be uniquely tailored to Nigeria and Boko
Haram.
In addition to those stated above, there are two other benefits of case studies. To begin,
case studies give a holistic focus to a topic, by “preserving and understand[ing] the wholeness
and unity of [a] case.”63 It does so by exploring a specific activity, group, etc., from multiple
methods and data sources, leading to a “rich description” of a phenomenon.64 Furthermore, case
studies allow abstract concepts, such as democracy, to be measured. This leads to strong
conceptual validity, which is “extremely difficult to do in statistical studies.”65 Strong conceptual
validity is beneficial because it allows those concepts that differ from culture to culture, such as
political freedoms and liberty, to be independently examined. Lastly, the case study method
allows (hypothetical) causal mechanisms and new hypotheses to be explored. Statistical studies
omit all contextual factors, “except those codified in the variables selected for measurement,”66
making it difficult to look at the intervening variables of a case and “identify what conditions
present in a case activate the causal mechanism.”67 Since this thesis aims to identify the causal
mechanisms of the Boko Haram insurgency, a case study method is necessary. Furthermore, it
may lead to new hypotheses that could not be identified by other statistical methods, since the
61

Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index of 2015: 27.
Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index of 2016:10.
63
Punch 2005, 144.
64
Somekh and Lewin 2005, 33.
65
George and Bennett 2004, 19.
66
Ibid, 21.
67
Ibid.
62
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statistical approach “can identify deviant cases that may lead to new hypotheses, but in and of
themselves, … lack any clear means of actually identifying new hypotheses.”68
Although there are many benefits to the case study approach, it is also necessary to
discuss its inherent shortcomings. First, there is the risk of case selection bias, which could
“[result] in inferences that suffer from systematic error.”69 This can lead to the overstating, or
understating, of the relationship or phenomena in question. The second problem with case
studies is their lack of representativeness and generalizability. Since case studies do not seek to
“select cases that are directly ‘representative’ of diverse populations…[they] should not make
claims that their findings are [generalizable] to such populations except in contingent ways.”70
This is because the greater the explanatory richness of a case, the less explanatory power it has
across cases.71 Thus, there appears to be a trade off between theoretical parsimony and the
establishment of explanatory richness of a case.72
Despite the inherent shortcoming to case studies, this method ultimately provides
invaluable information on the historical, religious, and demographic composition of Nigeria, as
well as the origins of Boko Haram. This information can then be used to craft policy
recommendations for the Nigerian Government and the international community. If this method
were not utilized, studying Boko Haram would be virtually impossible, since other qualitative
and statistical methods could not adequately address the multitude of contextual factors that may
have contributed to the rise of Boko Haram.

68

Ibid.
Ibid, 23.
70
Ibid, 31.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
69
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Literature Review
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and it will persist in the future. While case studies
themselves may run into problems with generalizability, we can still utilize and apply the general
literature on terrorism to study contemporary terrorist groups. This information will provide
insight into Boko Haram and will lead to a better understanding of contemporary terrorist
groups, as well as terrorism itself. Specific attention will be paid to the logic of terrorism, the
goals and strategies of terrorist groups, how the international community and individual nation
states typically respond to terrorism, the demise of terrorist groups, and the origins of Boko
Haram.
The logic of terrorism
Despite there being an enormous amount of research done on the subject, there is no
consensus over the definition of terrorism. For example, The Global Terrorism Index defines it
as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a nonstate actor to attain a
political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation,”73 whereas
Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter describe it as “the use of violence against civilians by
nonstate actors to attain political goals.”74 However, these two definitions do illustrate some
widely accepted beliefs about terrorism: it must have a political aim and it must involve violence.
Gaibulloev and Sanders agree with this notion and state, “the two biggest characteristics of
terrorism are violence and political social objectives.”75 For these reasons, this study considers
terrorism to be the threatened or actual use of force and violence against civilians, or a state, by
nonstate actors to obtain political objectives.
73

Institute of Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index of 2015, 6.
Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security, 31, no.
1 (2006): 52.
75
Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler, “An empirical analysis of alternative ways that terrorist groups
end,” Public Choice 160, no. 1-2 (2014): 28.
74
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Political aims can be defined as goals, which target some form of the following: regime
change, territorial change, policy change, social control, or status quo maintenance.76 At first,
this notion of preconceived political aims appears to be false, since some groups seem to be
solely religiously motivated. Yet even religiously motivated terrorist groups have political aims.
They strive for social control, which affects the political composition of a state. Hence, social
control can be considered a form of political control, which means every terrorist group,
including Daesh and Boko Haram, has political objectives.77 But to say that all terrorist groups
have a cohesive, coherent, political aim is extremely dangerous because ascribing political
significance to terrorist groups can actually give legitimacy to their cause.
It is certainly true that the utilization of violence is a necessary condition for a group to be
categorized as terrorists. Terrorist groups use violence to instill fear into their victims to achieve
their ultimate goals. Gaibulloev and Sanders elaborate on this by claiming, “violence in the
absence of [political or social goals] merely are criminal acts for extortion or sociopathic
reasons.”78 This argument is accurate, since political goals are a precondition for terrorism. Once
a group targets a particular “other” without any political goals in mind, then it ceases to be
classified as terrorism and is then considered ethnic cleansing or genocide.
Another aspect of terrorism involves the recipients of terrorist actions. Some, such as
Kydd, claim that terrorist actions are only those that aim at civilians. Others claim that state
officials, by nature of their occupation, are legitimate targets of terrorist attacks. However, the
definition that will be employed in this thesis will classify violence against state officials as
terrorism. Within the discussion of recipients, it becomes necessary to also address the nature of
terrorist attacks. Although some scholars, such as Michael Walzer, claim that terrorist attacks are
76

Kydd and Walter, 52.
These groups desire to establish an Islamic Caliphate.
78
Gaibulloev and Sandler, 28.
77
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unique in their randomness,79 this is not an adequate characterization. Since terrorist groups
desire to incite fear as a way to achieve their ultimate goal or goals, the most effective and
efficient way to do so is to attack areas, people, and cities of great prestige and significance.
Thus, these attacks may be calculated, but appear to be random, further inciting fear into the state
and civilian population. Robert Pape touches on this with specific reference to suicide terrorism,
a tactic frequently employed by Boko Haram. He states:
The vast majority of suicide terrorist attacks are not isolated or random acts by individual
fanatics, but rather, occur in clusters as part of a larger campaign, by an organized group to
achieve a specific political goal…The strategic logic of suicide terrorism is specifically
designed to coerce modern democracies to make significant concessions to national self
determination.80
This tactic is effective because it creates an atmosphere of uncertainty; the population fears that
an attack could occur at any time or place.
Also related to the logic of terrorism is the formation of terrorist groups. In order to better
understand Boko Haram, it is necessary to look at how traditional terrorist groups typically form.
Since this requires a much bigger conversation, including the capacity of states, this discussion
will take place in Chapter 2: The Rise.
The goals of terrorism
The goals of terrorism are the “ultimate desires” 81 that terrorist groups hope to achieve.
Although these groups must have political objectives, they can also have religious, social, and
economic goals. Some of these are detailed in the table below.82
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Table 2: Goals of Terrorism
Goal

Definition

Regime Change

Territorial Change
Policy Change
Social Control
Status Quo
Maintenance

Desire the overthrow of a government. Seek to
replace it with supporters of the terrorist group,
the terrorist group itself, or those similar to the
terrorist group.
Desire the establishment of a new state, to join
another state, or take territory away from the
state/government.
Desire a change in a state actor or a state actor’s
policy.
Constrains the behavior of individuals, rather
than the state.
Support for an existing regime or a territorial
arrangement against political groups that seek to
change it.

Political
Objective
X

Social
Objective

Economic
Objective

Religious
Objective

X

X

X

X

X

X
(Sometimes)
X
(Sometimes)

X

X

X

Adapted from Andrew H Kydd and Barabara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," International Security, 31,
no.1 (2006).

It is also important to note that these goals are not mutually exclusive, as terrorist groups can
have several, or even all, of the above goals.
In order to figure out the goals of a terrorist group, it is necessary to observe their rhetoric
and actions. For example, it is clear that Daesh aims for regime, policy, and territorial change, as
well as social control. They desire to establish an Islamic Caliphate throughout the world and
seek to eliminate Western influence in the Middle East. This is evident through their online
magazine and videos that show killings and anti-Western messages. Some other terrorist groups
include The United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia, who desire regime change and status quo
maintenance, and Al-Qaeda, who seeks regime, territorial, and policy change.83
Strategies that terrorist groups employ
Strategies are specific actions that terrorist groups take in order to achieve their broader
goals. Although specific methods differ from group-to-group, Kydd and Walter have compiled
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five overarching strategies that terrorist groups typically utilize. They are displayed in the table
below.84
Table 3: Terrorist Group Strategies
Strategy
Attrition
Intimidation
Provocation
Spoiling
Outbidding

Aim
Used to persuade the enemy that the terrorists are strong enough to impose
considerable costs if the enemy continues a particular policy.
Used to convince the civilian population that terrorists are strong enough to
punish disobedience and that the government is too weak to stop them, so
that people behave as terrorists wish.
Occurs when terrorists target their own population. Used to induce the
enemy to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which
radicalizes the population and moves them to support the terrorists.
Used to persuade the enemy that moderates on the terrorists’ side are weak
and untrustworthy.
Used to convince the public that terrorists have greater resolve to fight the
enemy than rival groups, and therefore are worthy of support.

Adapted from Andrew H Kydd and Barabara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," International Security, 31,
no.1 (2006).

Each of the above strategies is effective in its own way. Attrition forces the countries that are
targeted by the terrorists to conduct a cost/benefit analysis to see if the costs of fighting the
terrorist group will be too large to incur. These costs could be a multitude of things, such as
economic burden, human lives, cohesiveness of the state, and “state level of interest.”85
Ultimately, terrorist groups hope that this strategy will cause the state, person, or population to
accede to its demands. Groups that utilize the strategy of intimidation must effectively prove that
they are capable of harming civilians. Boko Haram has done this through episodes of mass
violence, suicide bombings, and kidnappings. Provocation is perhaps the most morally
problematic strategy since it involves directly harming civilians, whereas spoiling is the most
politically sophisticated technique, because it is designed to undermine potential peace
resolutions between the two actors. Finally, outbidding involves “winning” over the civilian
population by portraying their adversaries as weak. It is imperative that actors fighting terrorist
84
85

Ibid, 51.
Ibid, 60.

23
groups recognize the strategy being employed so that they respond wisely. If this is not done,
then these actors could unintentionally further legitimize the terrorist group by responding in the
manner that the group desires.
Of these strategies, Boko Haram most commonly employs intimidation, provocation, and
spoiling. By viciously attacking their fellow citizens, regardless of creed, age, and sex, Boko
Haram aims to show the population of Nigeria that they are in control. Although it may not
increase support for the group, it does cause citizens to follow the group, due to fear of
provocation. In addition, since the Nigerian Government has not been cohesive in their response
to Boko Haram, some citizens have turned to the group out of frustration. Once this occurs, Boko
Haram then convinces these followers that moderate Muslims, Christians, and the Nigerian
Government, are enemies of Allah.
Terrorist group longevity
In her research, Audrey Cronin claims that “modern terrorist groups don’t last long” and
that “more than half disappear within 10 years.”86 While it is difficult to address the accuracy of
this claim, past research indicates that a variety of characteristics contribute to the prolonged life
expectancy of terrorist groups. Perhaps the most important characteristic is the groups’ political
affiliation. According to Cronin, terrorist groups can be categorized as having one of the
following political affiliations: right wing, left wing, or ethnonationalist.87 Religious
fundamentalist groups are not included in her research, since the dominance of contemporary
religious terrorism began in the early 1990’s.88 However, she does state that these groups have an
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“inherent staying power of spiritually based motivations.”89 Gaibulloev and Sandler agree with
the notion that “religious fundamentalist terrorist groups pose a greater challenge to the existing
order [than other types of terrorist groups].”90 This is because they are the least likely to join the
political process, compared to right wing, left wing, and ethnonationalist terrorist groups.91 Of
these three classifications, Cronin believes that ethnonationalist terrorist groups have the longest
average life span since they have “support from [the] local populace of the same ethnicity for the
groups[’] political or territorial objective.”92
Brian Phillips agrees with this notion and provides further insight into the longevity of
terrorist groups. He claims that larger terrorist groups with violent rivalries are more likely to be
successful. His rationale is that violent rivalries increase the life expectancy of terrorist groups
by “encouraging civilians to pick a side to support, fomenting innovation, providing additional
incentives to group members, and spoiling peace talks.”93 Matthew Levitt agrees and even states
that the relationships between terrorist groups are what make international terrorism so deadly,94
which is further reason to be concerned about the relationship between Boko Haram and Daesh.
In addition to violent rivalries, location plays a role in the longevity of terrorist groups.
Gaibulloev and Sanders assert that terrorist groups in Sub-Saharan Africa “are more inclined to
end by joining the political process than those based in the Middle East and North Africa.”95 This
finding suggests that “base country elevation and jungles”96 contribute to an increased group life
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expectancy, since the terrain presents terrorists with opportunities to hide against military
adversaries.97 Thus, groups with multiple bases of operation are more likely to have increased
longevity.98
Based on the above classifications, Boko Haram, by its very nature, poses a significant
threat to Nigeria. With its location in Sub-Saharan Africa, tumultuous relationship with Daesh,
and label as a religious fundamentalist group, past research suggests that Boko Haram may be a
formidable foe to the Nigerian Government for years to come.
How terrorist groups typically end
Past research, although sparse, indicates that certain occurrences and actions contribute to
the demise of terrorist groups. For example, religious groups are less likely to join the political
process, since members are less likely to compromise on religious matters.99 In addition, groups
that have regime change, empire construction, and social revolution as their end goals are
typically less inclined to join the political process.100 Audrey Cronin also examines how terrorist
groups end and presents seven critical elements that lead to their demise. These seven elements
can be external or internal and are the:101 capture or killing of a leader, failure to transition to the
next generation, achievement of the group’s aim, transition to a legitimate political process,
undermining of popular support, repression, and transition from terrorism to other forms of
violence.
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When a leader is captured or killed, it “provides critical insight into the depth and nature of
the group’s popular support and usually represents a turning point.”102 However, Cronin says that
this could actually “backfire by creating increased publicity for the group’s cause and perhaps
[make] the leader a martyr who will attract new members to the organization.”103 Regarding the
failure to transition, “the internal process that occurs during the transition from first- to secondgeneration terrorist leaders is very sensitive,”104 which is why it can end a group. In addition,
some terrorist groups dissipate when they believe that their main goal has been met. Since
terrorism aims at a political goal, “the opening of negotiations can be a catalyst for the decline or
end of terrorist groups, potentially engendering a range of effects.”105 Cronin, like Gaibulloev
and Sandler, also believes that “a common effect of political processes is the splintering of
groups into factions that support the negotiations (or their outcome) and those that do not.”106
Thus, it could actually be beneficial for countries to begin political negotiations with certain
terrorist groups, as it could accelerate their demise. Furthermore, Cronin asserts, “terrorist groups
generally cannot survive without either active or passive support from a surrounding
population.”107 However, this statement is misleading because it makes the assumption that the
population supports the goals of terrorist groups and even encourages them to carry out violence
against their targets. Furthermore, it is not applicable to the majority of contemporary terrorist
groups. For example, the majority of Muslims in Syria and Iraq do not support Daesh and are
diligently fighting for their defeat. The same can be said for Boko Haram in Nigeria, who
employ particularly barbaric tactics. Lastly, repression (military force) and other existing threats
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may encourage terrorist groups to turn to “criminal behavior or more classic conventional
warfare.”108 If this occurs, then these groups would cease being considered terrorist groups and
would take on new classifications.
Responses to international and domestic terrorism
The rise of terrorism (both international and domestic) demands a response from the
international community, as well as individual nation-states. Yet, although terrorism has become
such a prevalent, modern political tool, there is still uncertainty as to how these actors should
respond. This uncertainty is largely due to the concept of responsibility. For each terrorist group,
the situation must be assessed to determine whether it is the responsibility of the state, the
international community, or both, to deal with the group. In the case of Boko Haram, this thesis
will argue that it is both the state and the international community’s responsibility. For this
reason, state reactions to international and domestic terrorism must be addressed.
Regarding international terrorism, it is difficult for the international community to create a
comprehensive, purposeful course of action. One explanation is because the “world community
[is] ideologically divided for and against the terrorists.”109 Paul Wilkinson believes that these
ideological divisions hamper international coalitions against terrorism since some states view
terrorism as a “legitimate, even heroic”110 political tool. A more plausible explanation is the
international community’s inability to agree over political issues, such as the extent to which to
United Nations should intervene in domestic affairs, conflicting views on economic policy, and
different conceptions of nonintervention. These differing views make it exceptionally difficult to
form effective international coalitions. However, despite these difficulties, the United Nations
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has successfully passed counter-terrorism resolutions. The most comprehensive resolution is the
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted in September of 2006.111 This resolution
is significant, as it was the first time that the General Assembly agreed upon a “common
strategic and operational approach to fight terrorism.”112 It is reviewed and amended every two
years, and has four main pillars: identify the conditions that allow terrorism to thrive, establish
measures that directly combat terrorism, create measures that build state capacity and strengthen
the United Nations, and ensure human rights for all people.113
Like the international community, individual nation-states have a difficult time responding
to the growing threat of international terrorism. They must anticipate and continuously thwart
attacks, typically through the use of intelligence systems. These systems, Wilkinson states, are
“an essential requirement for combating international terrorism…[and] time and again it is top
quality intelligence that has enabled security forces to act in time to foil a terrorist attack before
it can take place.”114
Whereas the international community typically addresses international terrorism, domestic
terrorism is handled by the host-country. This perception, that domestic terrorism should be
remedied by the affected nation-state, typically leads to a hands-off approach by the international
community. Their belief is that terrorist-ridden states typically lack effective intelligence
systems, credible court of laws/judicial systems, and “open dialogue between minority and
majority groups.”115 As a result, it is widely believed that nation-states must address their
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internal shortcomings in order to effectively counter domestic terrorism. However, this view
can be exceptionally dangerous because it could lead the international community to delay
intervention in a state, even when it is necessary. This occurred during the Rwandan
Genocide when the United Nations and member states failed to intervene and stop the
ethnic cleansing of the Tutsi. Thus, when a state is incapable of fixing the economic, political,
or social problems that are fueling terrorist groups, international intervention may be warranted.
As previously stated, the international community typically does not respond to domestic
terrorism. This type of terrorism rarely elicits an international response, due to the norms of nonintervention and sovereignty. These norms discourage the international community from
intervening in a state, unless human rights violations are taking place or the host-state clearly
asks for assistance. Yet even when these do occur, it does not guarantee a response from the
international community. Overall, this lack of action can be detrimental to the host-state, the
international community, and the civilian population involved.
Overview of Boko Haram
Boko Haram,116 which translates to “Western civilization is haram,”117 is a radical Islamic
terrorist group that was established in the Nigerian state of Borno in 2002.118 Its founder and first
leader was Muhammad Yusuf, “an Islamic theologian trained in the Salafi strand of Islam.”119
Yusuf’s views became the ideology of Boko Haram, which can be summed up as the “opposition
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to the totality of Western culture upon which its educational system is founded.”120 This ideology
translates into Boko Haram’s main goals, which include the “establishment of a socio-political
system based on its conception of the traditional Islamic model,”121 the creation of “[a] system of
education based purely on the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah as understood by the earliest
generation of Muslims (Salafs),”122 and an economic system characterized by trading and
farming instead of capitalism.123 The group has declared war on its enemies, which include
anyone who opposes their teachings or beliefs, including the Nigerian Government, state forces
(i.e. police), and the civilian population (i.e. Muslims, Christians, etc.).
The group carried out small-scale attacks against Nigerian security officials until July of
2009.124 During that month, the group had an exceptionally violent exchange with Nigerian
Government officials, which led to the death of Muhammad Yusuf by state police forces. His
successor, Abukar Shekau, was enraged by Yusuf’s death and stated that Boko Haram had “the
intention to retaliate.”125 In the years that followed, the group carried out attacks against the state
of Nigeria and rose to international prominence after its 2014 kidnapping of over 250 Chibok
schoolgirls.126 This incident sparked international condemnation and the creation of the
#BringBackOurGirls social media campaign. As a result, the United States deployed “80
members of its armed forces to Chad [to help look for the girls],”127 and “Canada, France, Israel
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and the U.K. sent special forces to Nigeria.”128 These efforts were largely unsuccessful and in
2015, Boko Haram further gained the attention of the international community when it pledged
allegiance to Daesh, who now refer to the group as the “Islamic State’s West Africa
Province.”129 This alliance raises concerns over the sophistication and capabilities of Boko
Haram, which the international community should not ignore.
The final issue that must be addressed is the classification of Boko Haram. This thesis
considers the group to be a domestic terrorist group with regional aims of destabilization and
political change. However, although Boko Haram may not have cells operating in Europe or
around the world, their global impact is still significant. With their intention of becoming a
regional influencer, global interests, allies, and people, may very well find themselves under
attack by Boko Haram. Thus, while they may currently be a domestic problem, the international
community should be watching.
Conclusion
After looking at past research on terrorism, it is clear that Boko Haram warrants further
studying. First, the conditions that gave rise to the group must be identified, so that Nigeria can
effectively prevent another group from following in Boko Haram’s footsteps. Second, the
concept of responsibility must be discussed; specifically, whether it is the sole responsibility of
the Nigerian Government, the international community, or both, to dismantle the terrorist group.
Finally, domestic and international response to the insurgency should be critically analyzed. If
there is to be any hope at eradicating Boko Haram and preventing future terrorist uprisings in the
state, then Nigeria must have a cohesive, coordinated response that targets Boko Haram at its
source. If this is not done, then Boko Haram will continue to exist, and potentially continue
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expanding, for years to come. Ultimately, this study seeks answers to the questions stated above
and to truly understand Boko Haram and the threat they pose.
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Chapter 2: The Rise
The rise of Boko Haram can be attributed to three main factors: Nigeria’s weak state
capacity, the politicization of religion, and their relationship with other terrorist organizations
(specifically, Al-Qaeda, Daesh, and Al-Shabab). Some of these factors can be traced back to the
colonial era, which has had clear, lasting influences in Nigeria, while others go back a few years
or decades. Ultimately, this chapter aims to counteract the notion that Boko Haram’s creation in
Nigeria was unpredictable and firmly argues that the emergence of the group is unsurprising
when taking these factors into consideration.
Factor 1: Weak State Capacity
A weakened state rarely prospers. “State capacity is one of the defining characteristics of
any political system [and can be defined as] the ability of a government to administer its territory
effectively.”130 States characterized as being weak are “inherently weak because of geographical,
physical, or fundamental economic constraints.”131 They are “basically strong, but temporarily or
situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or
external attacks.”132 Furthermore, weak states tend to “harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic, or
other inter-communal tensions” and have increasing urban crime rates, as well as large levels of
“venal corruption.”133 Having a weak state capacity is exceptionally dangerous because it can
create a power vacuum in which nonstate actors gain influence, following, and power in the
afflicted area; this is evident in Iraq and Syria with Daesh. In Nigeria, this weak state capacity is
due to colonialism and poor post-colonial governance, which led to the creation, and subsequent
rise, of Boko Haram.
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Colonialism in Africa
The modern political geography of Africa can be traced back to the Berlin Conference of
1884-1885, which “laid down the rules for the European partition of the African continent”134
and divided the country into different spheres of influence. During this conference, arbitrary
boundaries were drawn throughout the continent without any regard to the diverse ethnic,
religious, and cultural groups that were suddenly amalgamated. At the end of the conference,
each colonial power had a different sphere of influence. Great Britain controlled a variety of
territories stretching from South Africa to Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).135 Germany had
territories in Southwest and East Africa, including modern-day Cameroon, Tanzania, and Togo,
while Italy claimed Somaliland and part of Ethiopia.136 Spain received Equatorial Guinea,
Portugal controlled Malawi and Zimbabwe in Southern Africa, and Belgium claimed what is
now the Democratic Republic of Congo.137 However, these spheres of influence paled in
comparison to that of the French, which controlled countries such as Burkina Faso, Senegal,
Mali, and Niger (French West Africa), as well as Gabon and the Central African Republic
(French Equatorial Africa).138
As a result, the continent was comprised of countries that were a myriad of “grotesque
shapes and varied sizes.”139 Countries, such as Mali, were “so large and diverse that effective
government becomes difficult,” while countries like Burundi were “too small to make viable
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economic markets and are below the threshold of any possible industries.”140 The lasting effects
of this decision can still be felt in Africa today.
Colonialism and the creation of Nigeria
Although it was not carved from the Berlin Conference, the impacts of colonialism on
Nigeria help explain many of its modern-day problems, including Boko Haram. As Ambassador
John Campbell states, “Nigeria has danced on the brink [of state failure] from the very
beginning.”141 Prior to the British annexation of Nigeria in 1861,142 there were a succession of
ethnic empires, including the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba, two of Nigeria’s largest ethnic
groups.143 However, the most recent ethnic empire to rule Nigeria was the Sokoto Caliphate,144 a
powerful Islamic Caliphate that is thought to have been one of the “largest slaveholding
[empire’s].”145 The Caliphate was created in 1804 by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group and was run
by the Sultan of Sokoto,146 which was, and still is, the highest Muslim position in all of Nigeria.
The Sokoto Caliphate ruled until its defeat by the British in 1903.147
In 1861, the British annexed Lagos and made it a royal colony for commercial interests,
primarily palm oil.148 Modern Nigeria came into existence in 1914, when the British forcefully
amalgamated “three disparate, but adjacent territories…that [were] acquired over a century.”149
These territories, referred to as blocks, included: Lagos and Yorubaland,150 the Oil Rivers
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Protectorate,151 and the Middle Belt and the North, which came from the defeat of the Sokoto
Caliphate.152 These blocks were vastly different and were amalgamated by the British with
blatant disregard to the 250+ indigenous groups153 that resided throughout these territories.154
Prior to amalgamation, there was no “overarching cultural unity” amongst the different ethnic
groups.155 Hence, the British’s desire for a unified Nigeria was a failure from the very beginning.
The country of Nigeria, as well as a Nigerian national identity, “are British creations without
indigenous roots.”156
In an effort to keep the costs of their colony low157 and deal with the diversity present in
each of the three blocks, the British decided on a “divide-and-rule” policy.158 With this policy,
the British governed Nigeria as two separate entities,159 with indirect rule in the North (the
Middle Belt and the North block) and direct rule in the South (Lagos and Yorubaland and the Oil
Rivers Protectorate block). The British decided on a policy of indirect rule in the North because
they wanted to preserve the Sokoto Caliphate’s traditional Islamic institutions.160 This was likely
done to appease the various ethnic and Islamic groups that were deeply associated with the
Caliphate. As a result, they discouraged and informally banned Christian missionaries from
coming to the territory and “recognized traditional Islamic Sharia law.”161 Overall, this type of
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rule actually ended up disserving Northern Nigeria by preserving its pre-colonial and pre-modern
society, where there was little Western education and eventually, technological
underdevelopment.162 On the contrary, Southern Nigeria was introduced to Western institutions
and structures. Christianity was also widely adopted and missionaries “promoted modern
education and business practices that led to comparative prosperity…[and allowed people] to
become small traders and mechanics.”163 This created ethnic resentment, as the Yorubaland and
Oil Rivers blocks “increasingly became part of the modern world, while the North remained
largely pre-modern and apart.”164
In an attempt to respond to Nigeria’s multiethnic reality, the British eventually moved
towards a system of federation.165 This federation was based on the three initial blocks and was
divided into the following regions: The North (capital in Kaduna, dominated by the Hausa-Fulani
ethnic group), the East (capital at Enugu and dominated by the Igbo ethnic group), and the West
(capital at Ibadan and dominated by the Yoruba ethnic group).166 Lagos had a special status from
these blocks and was considered the overall “political and commercial capital [of Nigeria].”167
Although each region, and Lagos, had substantial autonomy, this decision by the British had the
“unintended consequence of ratifying the preeminence of the three big ethnic groups at the
expense of the numerous minority tribes.”168
Post WWI and WWII, there began to be talks of Nigerian independence from Britain,
particularly in the South. The North was much less receptive to the idea of independence because
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they were fearful of “domination by the more economically advanced and modern South.”169 In
1960, the British Government declared that it was within its national interest to withdraw from
their African colonies.170 In reality, this decision was likely due to the “winds of change inimical
to colonialism,” the Cold War, and the “rapid growth of independence agitation in the Gold
Coast.”171 Regardless of the reason, the British announced that they wanted to pursue an
independence process that would:
“Generate maximum Nigerian goodwill…and protect British economic and security
interests. Its goal was a government structure that took into account, and was acceptable
to, the Big Three and the myriad of smaller ethnic groups. The final constitutional
arrangements also recognized the profound cultural differences between the North and
the rest of the country.”172
Thus, the “Nigeria Project” emerged, which was comprised of British and indigenous elites.173
Their vision was:
“A huge nation of numerous ethnic groups and religions united by democracy, pursuit of
economic development, governance according to the rule of law, and the occupation of
an important place on the world stage… They intended for a friendly Nigeria to provide
Africans with a seat at the table with other great powers.”174
The first concrete step in the “Nigeria Project” was the Federal Character, which was created to
resolve “the problems of marginalization, disparity in socio-economic development and
education standards of different areas of Nigeria”175 that were the results of British colonialism.
It sought to provide equal access to all Nigerian citizens in public-sector employment, federal
offices, and natural resources,176 and eventually became the fundamental law in Nigeria. Yet,
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even after the Federal Character’s implementation, the country remained ethnically and
regionally united, as opposed to nationally.177
On October 1, 1960, Nigeria achieved independence.178 And in 1963, it became a
republic with Nnamdi Azikiwe179 as its first President.180 Many Nigerians refer to this time, the
late 1950’s to the early 1960’s, as the Golden Age due to the country’s increasing economic and
material development, thanks to oil and gas reserves.181 However, this all changed in 1966 when
a multitude of military coups began.182 By 1967, the country was unraveling due to “unresolved
ethnic rivalries combined with competition for spoils that the new [political] system could not
contain.”183 During this time, military coups were still occurring; many Northern and Western
leaders were murdered. Other Nigerians suspected the Igbo people, which resulted in widespread
retaliatory killings of the Igbo and Christians that lived in the North.184 As a result, the Igbo’s
fled back to Igboland, seceded, and then established the “independent, predominately Christian
state of Biafra.”185 This sparked the Nigerian Civil War, which lasted from 1967-1970.186 It was
fought between Biafra, led by General Ojukwu, and Nigeria, led by General Yakubu Gowon.187
During the Civil War, Nigeria was supported by the UK, USA, and the Soviet Union, although
these countries tried to “minimize their official involvement,”188 while Biafra received some
assistance from France, Portugal, and South Africa.189 The War ended in 1970 with General
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Gowon of Nigeria conquering Biafra; it is estimated that 500,000 – 1 million people were killed
through its entirety.190 Shortly after, Gowon promoted reconciliation through his “no winners, no
losers campaign;”191 however, an “unspoken consensus [emerged] that no Igbo could ever
[again] be the chief of state.”192
After the Civil War, Nigeria ventured into a new phase filled with corruption and
instability. And in an effort to manage the numerous religious and ethnic conflicts, leaders began
creating new states; there are now 36.193 In 1985, another military coup occurred, led by General
Ibrahim Bahangida, which established diplomatic ties with Israel and joined the Organization of
the Islamic Conference.194 The ensuing years consisted of more coups and violent military rulers,
until 1998. During this year, the Fourth Republic was established and the President became
ostensibly civilian, instead of military.195 The Fourth Republic is still the current structure of the
Nigerian Government and established equal legislative, executive, and judicial branches with
over 774 local government authorities.196 International leaders praised this, yet despite the
country officially returning to democratic rule in 1999,197 not much has changed since overt
military rule.
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Effects of Colonialism on Nigerian State Capacity
From its inception, Nigeria was systemically disadvantaged due to its forced
amalgamation by the British into an un-unified state.198 The long-term effects of colonialism on
Nigerian state capacity included an increase in ethnic and religious conflicts, the
institutionalization of ethnic rivalry,199 and mass discrepancies between the Northern and
Southern regions. By governing via divide and rule, the British effectively pitted the different
ethnic groups against each other, which furthered “inter-ethno-religious suspicion, residential
segregation and antagonism among various communal groups…[This eventually led to] strong
regional affiliations and loyalty,”200 as opposed to national loyalty. Thus, Nigeria is effectively a
“‘mere geographical expression,’ not a nation.”201 As a result, ethnic groups must fight against
government marginalization.202 This has caused citizens to have a “receptive disposition towards
the use of force or violence as a means of securing one’s group interests,”203 which is evident in
the dozens of military coups that ensued in the late 20th century.
Failure of the Nigerian Government
Although colonialism disadvantaged Nigeria from its inception and led to the government
institutions that we see today, research suggests that the Nigerian Government could have
prevented at least some of its modern problems.204 In particular, had the Government not turned
towards corruption and kleptocracy shortly after Nigeria gained its independence, then a
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different state may exist today. For this reason, the poor governance of Nigeria must be
addressed.
1. Corruption and kleptocracy
As previously mentioned, Nigeria has historically been plagued by “obscene
corruption perpetuated by government officials.”205 Since the country began tapping into
its oil reserves in the 1950’s, a “tiny elite benefitted from the country’s oil
wealth…which [has stunted] broad economic and social development.”206 This continued
post-Civil War and led to the “self enrichment of individual military officers [, which
was] made possible by immense oil revenues combined with weak institutions of
governance little accountable to the public.”207 This led to rampant inequality between
citizens and elites in Nigeria. Thus, despite Nigeria becoming so wealthy, corruption has
made its “income distribution among the most unequal in the world.”208
2. Political instability
In Nigeria, the law is seen as being a “political instrument for achieving political
gains by the elites.”209 This fosters mass distrust between citizens and the Government by
making people feel that political offices have no accountability to the public.
Furthermore, the political instability of Nigeria is made worse by the Government’s lack
of transparency, particularly during elections. Perhaps the best example of this is the
1999 Presidential election, where President Obasanjo was accused of “massive
rigging.”210 This did not meet the “minimum standards for democratic elections” and was
“marred by serious irregularities and fraud [in at least 11 states].”211 These included
“ballot box stuffing, changing of results, falsification of result sheets, ballot box
snatching”212 and accounts of underage citizens/young children voting.213
3. Wavering economy
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“The economic policies of the federal government are a reflection of the special
interests who control it.”214 Nigeria’s dependence on oil has made it vulnerable to the
world oil market, “thereby reducing budgeting and long-term development plans into
academic exercises.”215 They are effectively “held hostage to the will of multinational oil
companies whose position is strengthened by Nigeria’s lack of requisite technology to
exploit her oil resources.”216
These three factors furthered historical divisions and inequality in Nigeria, and, unsurprisingly,
led to widespread dissatisfaction amongst its many citizens. This dissatisfaction gave rise to
feelings of animosity towards the Government and other Nigerians, which further devolved the
country. What resulted was a “perfect storm” of anger and instability, particularly in the North,
which Boko Haram subsequently took advantage of. The role of this dissatisfaction and anger is
discussed in further detail below.
How Boko Haram rose because of Nigeria’s weak state capacity
The growing inequality in Nigeria and lack of basic needs has created a “massive vacuum
in infrastructural development,” which, combined with poverty, poor governance, and state
failure, have been shown to “provide a perfect breeding ground for militancy and subsequent
instability.”217
Around 2007, Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram’s founder, began preaching about his
strong disdain for the “inequitable political and economic system in Nigeria.”218 He, along with
many others, perceived this to be social injustice perpetuated by the ruling elites through the
“mismanagement of the collective wealth of the nation.”219 The President of the Civil Rights
Congress in Nigeria addressed this topic in a 2011 speech:
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“Yusuf took advantage of [the] poor quality of our educational system, the incessant
strikes, and cult activities…the irresponsible leadership at all levels of government,
unemployment, poverty, corruption, and insecurity. And as he pointed out such failures,
citing verses of the Quran and saying of the prophet, the youths saw him as the leader
who will indeed deliver them from malevolence into the Promised Land.”220
Yusuf was successful because ideology “has the strong capability to create social mobilization,
and the group behind the mobilization can effectively exploit the frustrations in a society to
promote its held beliefs.”221 Thus, the “disgruntled population [of Nigeria]”222 was fairly quick to
accept the notion that the problems facing the nation were primarily due to Western civilization.
The next question that comes to mind is why Boko Haram rose in the northern portion of the
country? The answer is fairly simple; Northern Nigeria has been the hardest hit in the entire
country. The following factors have played a direct role:
1. Poverty
Northern Nigeria contains the majority of impoverished people in the country
with over “73% of the population [living] in absolute poverty.”223 With no food,
many young Nigerians are joining Boko Haram due to “perceived social injustice by
the ruling elite”224 and the promise of “50 to 150 naira225 each [for their service to the
group].”226 This is because “people who are poor…are prone and easy to be
persuaded by people who could promise them anything.”227 Thus, it logically follows
that some people would partake in the violence of Boko Haram, even suicide
bombings.
Furthermore, Northern Nigeria is very rich in solid mineral resources, yet these
reserves remain largely untapped because of the country’s reliance on crude oil
revenue228 and the high capital and long-term investment that is necessary for the
acquisition of mineral resources.229 This is unsurprising considering political elites
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“always prefer to invest in short-term project[s] that will yield a political profit, not
necessarily as a dividend of democracy for
the people.”230 However, this doesn’t minimize the incredible detriment that it has
had on their economy.
2. Lack of education
In 2012, Borno had a 14.5% literacy level, whereas Lagos (a Southern state) had
92%.231 This discrepancy can be traced back to the colonial policy of divide-and-rule.
In the North, most children in school were, and still are, focused on memorizing the
Quran. Few graduate with the skills necessary to participate in a modern economy.232
As a result, animosity towards Western education has increased because Northerners
view it as a form of neocolonialism, dating back to the British. It is also seen as a way
to perpetuate Southern control, and perceived superiority, over the North. Boko
Haram was able to tap into this lack of education and resentment.
3. Unemployment
The Northern economy is largely based on agriculture and the mining of natural
resources, with most of the population pursuing agricultural related careers.233
However, these sectors have been in complete disarray for more than four decades
because of “disbandment of regional governments, concentrating power in the
central government; and almost total dependency on crude oil revenue.”234 This
dependence on oil has exacerbated tensions and increased resentment of the South
because it is the main oil producing area of the country. Thus, unlike the North, the
South benefits from Nigeria’s oil monopoly.
4. Lack of electricity
Many industries in Northern Nigeria have closed because of widespread power
outages.235 This has led to massive unemployment in the region, since large
industries cannot function without electricity. As a result, a cycle is created where
people who are laid off do not have the capital necessary to support smaller
businesses, which eventually close due to lack of profit.236
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5. Political dissatisfaction
Three political events can be attributed to the rise of Boko Haram in the North:
the Presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo, the killing of Mohammad Yusuf, and the
ending of zoning by President Goodluck Jonathan in 2011. The Presidency of
Olusegun Obasanjo, specifically the years 1999-2000, was characterized by the
dismissal of Northern political officeholders. This was viewed as “systematic
marginalization of the North.”237
Years later, in 2009, Muhammad Yusuf was killed by Nigerian security forces,
which marked “Boko Haram’s transformation from a peaceful to a violent
movement.”238 Yusuf’s successor, Abubakar Shekau, was more aggressive and
much less educated,239 which “played a major role in radicalizing the movement.”240
One year later, in May of 2010, President Umaru Yar’ Adua (a Northern Muslim)
died and was succeeded by Vice President Goodluck Jonathan (a Christian
Southerner).241 The following year, presidential elections were held. Under
zoning,242 a political “agreement between the country’s elite to alternate the
presidency between candidates from the Christian South and Muslim North,243
President Goodluck Jonathan should have stepped aside so that another Northern
Muslim could be president. In a stunning decision, he decided to run and won,
although there is significant doubt about the integrity of this election.244 This was
perceived by the North to be a “continuation of [the] process of marginalization and
raised the specter that it had become irreversible.”245 As a result, Nigeria effectively
split into North and South, Muslim and Christian. Boko Haram took advantage of
these new, deep cleavages and drew supporters because of their decision to
challenge the legitimacy of Goodluck Jonathan’s Presidency. They did so because
people “who did not support Jonathan were well disposed to acquiesce to or even
support an insurgency against the federal government.”246
All of the events and factors discussed above allowed Boko Haram to construct a
philosophy that utilized and drew on Nigerian fear, anger, and worry. People felt that Boko
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Haram represented their interests when the Government did not, and could make their concerns
heard at all costs.
Factor 2: Religious politicization
As previously mentioned, Nigeria is neither unified nor inclusive, primarily due to poor
governance and colonialism. However, it would be inaccurate to presume that Boko Haram arose
solely because of Nigeria’s weak state capacity.247 The religious factor must be addressed,
especially because “societies divided along religious lines are more susceptible to intense
conflicts than those divided by political, territorial, and ethnic differentiations.”248
First, it is necessary to discuss the nature of religion. Religion can facilitate social
harmony and peace, but across many societies, it has been transformed into the opposite. Instead,
religious intolerance, fundamentalism, and extremism have become increasingly popular and
have created “the base (sub-structure) upon which other sources of religious violence (superstructure) rest.”249 These terms are defined below:
Table 4: Difference between religious intolerance, fundamentalism, and extremism

Religious Intolerance
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“Hostility towards other religions, as well as the inability of
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§ Encompasses bigotry and animosity towards people
with differing beliefs.251
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Religious Fundamentalism

Religious Extremism

“Promotes the literal interpretation of, and strict adherence to
religious doctrine, especially as a return to orthodox
scriptural prescriptions and doctrinal originality.”253
§ Manifestation of religious intolerance
“Religious fundamentalists who take religious conservatism
and intolerance to an unreasonable extent by manifesting
violence against those who hold contrary religious views.”254
§ Manifestation of religious intolerance

It is imperative to state that religious fundamentalism and religious intolerance do NOT
necessarily lead to religious extremism or violence. However, when it does, groups such as Boko
Haram emerge. These “groups abhor the preaching of other faiths and resort to violence to stop
it. They do not submit to any compromise, but demand that their religious doctrines be
universally entrenched by brute force.”255 They also demand that political, social, and economic
systems adhere to their religious tenets.256 For Islamic extremist groups in particular, including
Boko Haram, the concept of jihad is employed. Contrary to Western belief, jihad does not
translate to “holy war.”257 In actuality, jihad means, “struggling or striving and applies to any
effort exerted.”258 Some of the things that Muslims are called to strive for in jihad include:259
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Recognizing Allah and loving Him most
Resisting pressure of parents, peers, and society
Performing righteous deeds
Freeing people from tyranny
Helping those who may not be Muslim
Removing treacherous people from power
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Thus, true jihad is peaceful and “does not include striving for individual or national power,
dominance, glory, wealth, prestige or pride.”260 Unfortunately, extremists and adversaries of the
Islamic faith have manipulated the concept of jihad. Their interpretation encourages the use of
violence to perpetuate their ideology, which they claim in the name of Islam. The justification
for violent jihad by extremist groups can be explained in the following way:
“Jihad [is] an instrument for purging Islam of modernization with its perceived
adulteration of orthodox principles. This explains the predominance of religious violence
in the Muslim dominated northern part of Nigeria where inflexible adherence to Islam
orthodoxy…continues to grow steadily.”261
Other characteristics of violent jihad include enlisting conformity and conversion by brute force.
For these reasons, religious extremism is the most dangerous form of religious intolerance.262
Religious politicization and its hold on Nigeria
Prior to delving into this section, it is important to address one of the most commonly
perpetuated myths about Boko Haram and religion; the belief that more Christians have been
targeted than Muslims. This is false. While it is true that Christians have, and still are being,
targeted by the group, it is widely agreed263 that Boko Haram’s casualties have largely been
Nigerian Muslims, due to the groups “indiscriminate scorched-earth campaign against
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anyone…who didn’t subscribe to the group’s harsh doctrine.”264 The explanation for this
targeting is evident in a 2014 video where Shekau stated, “I am going to kill all the imams and
other Islamic clerics in Nigeria because they are not Muslims since they follow democracy and
constitution.”265
Overall, Nigerian’s are “highly religious people.”266 The country has consistently been
ranked as one of the most religious countries in the world, with nine-in-ten people stating that
religion is very important to them.267 Religious politicization can be defined as using religion for
the achievement of certain political and economic goals.268 In terms of extremist groups, it can
be used to consolidate power or mobilize support269 and is clearly evident in Shekau’s above
statement. It is not a new phenomenon, but has been “part of the broader range of
political/religious activism that has dotted the history of Northern Nigeria since Usman Dan
Fodio’s Jihad in the 19th century.”270
Usman Don Fodio was a 19th century Fulani religious and political leader. In 1802, he
launched a violent jihad to reform “ungodly practices of Hausa rulers who he considered to be
anti-Islamic.”271 Fodio successfully overthrew the Hausa and established the Sokoto Caliphate,272
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where Sharia law was used for “ethical and principled leadership.”273 This Caliphate “laid the
foundation for the dominance and politicization of Islam in Northern Nigeria”274 and ruled until
the British defeated them. However, although the Sokoto Caliphate was politically defeated,
British indirect rule allowed the values and ideals held by the Caliphate to remain largely intact.
In particular, the British “integrated the pre-colonial Sharia courts into the new colonial state,”275
effectively legislating Sharia law across Northern Nigeria. The remnants of this can still be seen
in certain areas of Nigeria today.
Because of the disparate ruling style by the British, Nigerian independence posed a
significant issue for the country. Since the North had effectively been ruling itself with Muslim
leaders under the British, they felt they had a “predetermined right to rule.”276 Naturally, they did
not want to change the systems that had been in place for centuries, so when a unitary
government was created, the North was fairly unhappy. This contributed to “manifestations of
religious militancy [in the late 1970’s], whose members remained committed to Islamic religious
purity and anti-democratic/capitalist/Westernized objectives.”277 Perhaps the most notorious of
these groups was the Maitatsine, who gained notoriety in the 1980’s. The Maitatsine were
compromised of youths, “unemployed migrants, and other disenfranchised Nigerians who felt
that the official Islamic hierarchy and the Nigerian Government were unresponsive and
indifferent to their needs.”278 These uprisings are notable because they “represent the first violent
attempts at imposing a strict version of religious ideology on a pluralistic, independent Nigeria
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by extreme religious movements”279 and their reasons for organizing are “echoed in the
contemporary Boko Haram crisis.”280 As a result, religious animosity turned violent and “sowed
the seeds of bitter rivalry, suspicion, and discord between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria.”281
This violence hit its peak in 2000 when 12 Northern states implemented Sharia law, in an
attempt to reclaim the lost political power “which they had hitherto benefitted immensely from
during the colonial era and the decades in which Nigeria was ruled by northern politicians and
generals.”282 This decision effectively:
“Set in motion a process of brinkmanship that poses serious threats to the unity of
Nigeria, as complex, multiple, and overlapping divisions and contradictions are reduced
to two mutually exclusive primordial camps. Nigerians who in their real lives combine
their Christianity or their Islam with ‘pagan practices,’ and who are ideologically
‘progressives’ or conservatives’, or ‘fundamentalists’ or even ‘atheists’, are all pushed
into two neat and opposed camps- soldiers of either God or Allah.”283
How religious politicization gave rise to Boko Haram
It is this author’s belief that the politicization of a religion tends to give-way to
polarization amongst its adherents, which can lead to religious extremism. At the point of
extremism, it becomes easy to justify violence on another group because you perceive them to be
infidels, who are evil and unholy. Thus, the only way to get rid of the perceived evil is to destroy
it. This perversion of religion leads to the creation of a self-serving “doctrine of action and
hatred, where spiritual achievement occurs through destruction rather than personal
enlightenment.”284 This doctrine, coupled with the declaration of Sharia law by some states in
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Northern Nigeria in 2000,285 allowed individuals to rationalize engaging in disruptive and violent
acts against the Nigerian Government, who they perceived to be corrupt, infidels, or both. This
further divided the nation and exacerbated sectarian suspicions.286 It also led to the creation of
groups like Boko Haram who politicized religion as a means of political dissent against the
Nigerian Government. To be clear, political dissent does not always lead to violence, which is
evident with Boko Haram pre-2009. The group was largely nonviolent, until the murder of their
founder and leader, Muhammed Yusuf by Nigerian Security Forces in 2009. However, lack of
frequent violence does not mean lack of animosity. Yusuf was a staunch enemy of the secular
Nigerian state and a pinnacle example of a religious extremist.
After the loss of their leader, Boko Haram had even more of a reason to rebel against the
Nigerian Government. They began utilizing violent methods and “religious manipulation to
divert the attention of [Nigerians] from their harsh living conditions…to make war against their
opponents.”287 They did so by convincing people that:
1. “Any member who fights and dies – by suicide bombing or otherwise – in the process of
establishing a Sharia state would automatically become a martyr and gain the reward of
Aljanna paradise or heaven.”288
2. Sharia law is the only “valuable option for social justice and prosperity.”289
3. “Socialism, capitalism, military dictatorship, western education and modern statecraft
have all failed because God was excluded from these systems.”290
4. “[Nigeria] was an Islamic state before it was turned into a land of kafir (infidel), the
current system is contrary to true Muslim beliefs.”291
5. The solution to the problems plaguing Nigeria was to “return to the noble, honourable,
moral and perfect principles of the rule of Islamic religion [the Sokoto Caliphate].”292
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Overall, Boko Haram was very successful in gaining new adherents because religious identity
tends to serve as an easy mobilizer for terrorism.293 It does so by creating “power where there is
none or [consolidating] power where there is very little.”294 This is done through the “purposeful
actions of political actors who actively create violent conflict by selectively drawing on religion
in order to portray it as religiously inevitable.”295 Thus, “coupled with its radical ideology and
anti-Western position, Boko Haram [became] a tool for murderous expression of political
embitterment.”296
In closing, it becomes necessary to reaffirm that Boko Haram lacks religious sincerity.297
Their activities have received widespread condemnation from the Muslim community in Nigeria,
including the Sultan of Sokoto 298 and the Emir of Kano.299 Thus, to reiterate, it is the
“politicization of religion, rather than religious differences or identities”300 that can be attributed
to the rise of Boko Haram.
Factor 3: Relationship with other terrorist organizations
After Yusuf’s death, Boko Haram split into multiple factions,301 making it difficult to
know which faction, if any, has complete authority to speak for the group. Thus, it becomes
harder to know the full extent and interaction that Boko Haram has had with other terrorist
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organizations. However, despite this difficulty, it is not improbable that Boko Haram gained
valuable insight from direct, or indirect, communication with Al-Qaeda, Daesh, and Al-Shabab.
Since these groups are some of the deadliest and most prominent international terrorist groups in
the world, these relationships, and their effects on Boko Haram, must be explored.
Al-Qaeda
In June of 2010, Abdelmalek Droukdel, the emir of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), said that his group “would provide Boko Haram with weapons, training and other
support.”302 Naturally, nations became alarmed at the possibility of these groups working
together. In 2011, these fears came to fruition when Abubekar Shekau stated, “Al-Qaeda are our
elder brothers… we enjoy financial and technical support from them. Anything we want from
them we ask them.”303 This relationship appeared to evolve in 2012 when AQIM gained territory
in northern Mali. It’s believed that Boko Haram set up bases in the AQIM-held territory and
helped the group secure the Gao region.304 This was inferred after Boko Haram raided the
Algerian Consulate in Gao and kidnapped, and later executed, its vice-consul.305
Daesh
After months of speculation, the relationship between Daesh and Boko Haram was
confirmed in March of 2015.306 During this time, Shekau pledged allegiance to Daesh and its
leader (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) and began referring to Boko Haram as the “Islamic State West
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African Province.”307 Shortly after, Daesh began promoting Boko Haram to its followers and
“encouraging Muslims to join Boko Haram and other militants that operate in West Africa.”308
However, this relationship took a turn on August 3, 2016 when Daesh announced replacement of
Abubekar Shekau, due to his “targeting of fellow Muslims.”309 Their replacement was Abu
Musab al-Barnawi, Muhammad Yusuf’s son,310 who had frequently stated that “attacks on
mosques, markets, and other venues belonging to Muslims do not represent IS, they represent
themselves…We don’t authorize or approve such attacks.”311 As is to be expected, Shekau was
anything but accepting of Daesh’s announcement. As a result, Boko Haram is thought to have
further splintered into different factions, with some pledging allegiance to Shekau and others to
Barnawi’s Daesh faction.
How relationships with other terrorist groups gave rise to Boko Haram
It is necessary to reiterate that Boko Haram’s relationship with the aforementioned
terrorist groups is not concrete, conclusive, or completely understood. As previously stated, the
lack of a formal organizational structure has made it difficult to track Boko Haram and decipher
their true connections with these groups. However, this thesis contends that regardless of
informal or formal ties, the increased communication between these groups is likely indicative of
Boko Haram’s desire to increase its legitimacy and clout. Through their relationships with other
terrorist groups, Boko Haram was able to develop into a full-fledged insurgency. The tactics that
Boko Haram likely learned from them are listed below.
1. International Notoriety
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In 2012, Boko Haram officially pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda.312 This forced
nations around the world to pay attention to Boko Haram and consider whether it had
the potential to become the next large international terrorist organization. Thus, from
the stance of Boko Haram, this was a smart move that greatly enhanced their
international legitimacy.
This increase in legitimacy became clear on November 14, 2013313 when the
United States designated Boko Haram as foreign terrorist organization. Some experts
were unhappy with this designation because they felt that it had the potential to
further legitimate Boko Haram, promote its consolidation, and “increase the
incentives for globally focused terrorist groups to seek deeper linkages with groups in
the North.”314 The Nigerian Government was also “adamantly opposed to the
designation,”315 for many of the same reasons. The then-Nigerian Ambassador to the
United States had a lot to say on this subject and asserted that:
“In order to effectively combat Boko Haram, we need American help to be
complimentary – not contradictory – to our own efforts. The current wellintentioned efforts by a few members of Congress to classify the Boko Haram
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) actually risk deepening and
entrenching the Boko Haram movement, thereby endangering more lives.”316
Further legitimacy was given to the group in March of 2015317 when they pledged
allegiance to Daesh. This pledge was of particular concern to the United States and
Western Europe because of their close proximity to the African continent, as opposed
to Daesh’s home base in Syria.
2. Funding
It is widely speculated that Al-Qaeda has given Boko Haram funds318 and
encouraged them to kidnap people, particularly foreigners, for money.319 This advice
proved beneficial for Boko Haram when the group was paid $3 million for a French
family taken hostage in northern Cameroon in 2013.320 And for the kidnapping of
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wealthy Nigerians, “some US officials estimate that the group is paid as much as $1
million for [their] release.”321
Other funds for the group appear to be secured through bank looting and
connections with Nigerian politicians and government officials.322 Boko Haram has
apparently been very successful in securing funds from these sources and had a 2015
“annual net income [of] $10 million.”323
3. Recruitment
As previously mentioned, Boko Haram has been very good at recruiting followers
through the politicization of religion and anti-government sentiment. However, in
2015, Boko Haram began increasingly using propaganda, especially social media and
videos. These propaganda methods were much more sophisticated than those used by
the group in the past and “bore signs of the influence of IS [the Islamic State].”324 In
particular, “Boko Haram’s Twitter feed [, called Al-Urwah al-Wuthqa, began] posting
a stream of short statements about the group’s activities, claiming operations in a
timely manner, in the [mold] of the Islamic State’s one-line tweeted claims.”325 In
addition, their videos transitioned from being grainy at-home productions to
professional videos with “designed graphics and high-quality opening sequences”326
with “multiple languages and well-presented subtitles.”327 Many of these videos were
of beheadings and also “bore remarkable similarities to IS beheading videos.”328
Despite their increase in propaganda and technological sophistication, Boko
Haram does not possess anywhere near the level of sophistication shown by Daesh.
For example, the group still has many spelling mistakes in tweets and videos,
amongst other media downfalls.329 Thus, their in-person recruitment is likely much
more successful than their social media efforts.
4. Training
After Al-Qaeda captured Menaka in northern Mali in 2012, Nigeria military
officials noticed a large increase in the number of Boko Haram militants that were
traveling to the area, likely to receive training from AQIM.330 It is also thought that
Boko Haram received training from Al- Shabab in Somalia from 2010-2012.331
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During that time, the group was likely taught how to more effectively carry out
attacks, such as suicide bombings.332
5. Weapons
There has long been speculation about Boko Haram’s procurement of weapons.
Much of this mystery involves the apparent weapons trade between the group, AlQaeda, and Al-Shabab. Because of their growing relationship with Al-Qaeda in 2012,
there were concerns that Boko Haram was going to use man-portable air-defense
systems to shoot down commercial planes that were flying into Niger, Chad and
Nigeria, which “was a tactic employed in 2002 by an al-Qa’ida-linked Somali
terrorist cell.”333 Furthermore, a 2016 interview with Nigeria’s National Security
Chief, General Abdirahman Sheikh Issa Mohamed, revealed the state’s belief that
Boko Haram had learned how to build weapons in Al-Shabab training camps.334
Boko Haram also gained weapons by ransacking police stations and military
bases335 and smuggling weapons from abroad.336 Some of these weapons include
“rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) with a 900 meter range for attacking hardened
targets from long distances and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for ambushing
military and police convoys.”337
6. Shifting Ideology
As previously stated, Boko Haram’s ideology moved towards violence after
Yusuf’s death in 2009. However, this was not the only way that their message
changed. During this time, Boko Haram also began to have an increasingly antiWestern agenda, as opposed to a primarily domestic one. This can be partially
attributed to AQIM and was evident in a video message from one of Boko Haram’s
adherents in May of 2010. In it, the combatant says:
“We will carry out our operations anywhere in the world if we can have the
chance. The United States is the number one target for its oppression and
aggression against Muslim nations, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan and
its blind support to Israel in its killings of our Palestinian brethren. We will
launch fiercer attacks than Iraqui or Afghan mujahidin against our enemies
throughout the world, particularly in the United States, if the chance avails
itself…but for now, our attention is focused on Nigeria, which is our starting
point.”338
332

Stephanie Busari, “Boko Haram sought terror training in Somalia, security chief says,” CNN, last
modified February 25, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/25/africa/boko-haram-al-shabaabsomalia/index.html.
333
Zenn, 2013.
334
Busari.
335
Chothia.
336
Zenn, 2013.
337
Ibid.
338
Ibid.

60

Whether this combatant speaks for the entire group is unknown, but Boko Haram’s
shift to a more global perspective is not.
These shifts show Boko Haram’s ability to evolve at an almost dizzying rate.339
Furthermore, it has demonstrated a “great flexibility in ideology and methods,
depending on who they choose to align with.”340 This is cause for domestic and
international concern and sheds insight as to how the group may respond to future
challenges.
Conclusion
To reiterate, the rise of Boko Haram was not sudden, random, or unexpected. The weak
state capacity of Nigeria, which can be attributed to colonialism and the failure of the Nigerian
Government post-independence, combined with the increasing politicization of religion, created
a power vacuum that Boko Haram took advantage of. They responded to Nigerian dissatisfaction
with corruption, inequality, and discrimination and became a group that people naturally
gravitated towards. Through horrific attacks and atrocities, Boko Haram was able to gain respect
and foster relationships with other terrorist organizations, which helped them further develop
into the insurgency that we see today.
It is imperative to identify, study, and analyze how terrorist groups arise for two
overarching reasons. First, you can’t fight against what you don’t understand. By understanding
the reasons for Boko Haram’s existence, it then becomes easier to propose solutions to rectify
and counteract the group. Second, it shows shortcomings in both governance and economic
systems. In the case of Boko Haram, the Nigerian Government must confront their shortcomings
and policies that attributed to the group’s rise. For these reasons, the following chapter will
address domestic and international responses to Boko Haram, which will inform final policy
prescriptions.
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Chapter 3: Government Response
In order to fully understand the rise and progression of Boko Haram in Nigeria, the
response of government actors must be studied. By identifying the shortcomings and successes in
government response, future policy can be created based on these findings. For this reason, this
chapter first addresses the response of the Nigerian Government since Boko Haram’s inception
and then looks at the response of international actors involved in the crisis.
Domestic Response
The Obasanjo Era (May 29, 1999-May 29, 2007)
In 2003, Muhammad Yusuf and his followers began engaging in skirmishes with local
governments in the North due to violations of “local ordinances.”341 As friction between these
two groups grew, Boko Haram began carrying out sporadic attacks on Nigerian Security Forces,
particularly regional officials and police.342 As attacks increased, Muhammad Yusuf became
fearful of being arrested and fled to Saudi Arabia in 2005. He remained there until Northern
officials reassured him that he would not be killed upon return.343 This reassurance led to an
“uneasy truce” between Boko Haram and government officials for about four years.344
During this time, Boko Haram was considered to be more of a regional problem than a
national one. As a result, individual states were left with the responsibility of figuring out ways
to quell the group. Due to capacity limitations, regional governments were unable to adequately
understand and react to the root causes of Boko Haram’s mobilization. Thus, from the very
341
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beginning of the insurgency, the root causes of mobilization were ignored and as the group grew,
federal government concern remained stagnant. Years later, in a 2017 BBC interview, President
Olusegun Obasanjo acknowledged his government’s lackluster response to Boko Haram and
stated that they “did not do what [they] should have done.”345 Instead, the group was left to
“become a very intractable problem.”346
The Yar’Adua Era (May 29, 2007-May 5, 2010)
The informal truce between the government and Boko Haram came to an end in July of
2009 when Muhammad Yusuf’s followers began attacking police stations in northern states, in
an attempt to free captured members.347 As a result, Yusuf was taken into custody by police and
extrajudicially executed.348 Mass outrage ensured, forcing President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua to
open an investigation into the killing.349
Days later, under the new leadership of Abubekar Sheaku, Boko Haram began violently
rioting in Borno, Yobe, and Bauchi States.350 President Yar’Adua could not ignore the violence
and created a responsive strategy that utilized “hard [military] power through kinetic
operations.”351 This large-scale military response was portrayed by the Administration as being
the solution that would finally defeat Boko Haram “once and for all.”352 Once the riots had been
quelled by the Military, “national and local leaders concluded that the problem of Boko Haram
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had been solved.”353 All was well until November, when President Yar’Adua became extremely
ill and was taken to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment.354 By February of 2010, due to the
President’s prolonged incapacitation, Vice President Goodluck Jonathan was designated by the
Senate to be the acting president.355 Around that time, Al-Jazeera released video footage of
“Nigerian security forces shooting unarmed detainees and civilians during the [2009]
uprising.”356 As international outrage mounted, President Yar’Adua passed away in May of
2010, making Goodluck Jonathan the official President of Nigeria.357
The decision by the Yar’Adua administration to respond to Boko Haram with brute force
was heavy-handed and ineffective. By taking a solely military approach in terms of response, the
administration eliminated the possibility of creating solutions to the systemic causes of the crisis.
Furthermore, Muhammad Yusuf’s death is directly responsible for the group’s descent into a
full-fledged insurgency. However, it is necessary to recognize that President Yar’Adua’s illness
likely hindered his administrations ability to effectively respond to Boko Haram.
The Jonathan Era (May 5, 2010-May 29, 2015)
By inheriting the Presidency, President Jonathan also inherited the problem of Boko
Haram. At the time of his inauguration, international condemnation was still swirling
surrounding the 2009 Al-Jazeera video. Throughout 2010, various organizations, including the
U.S. Department of State, began citing human rights abuses by Nigerian security officials in the
fight against Boko Haram. These violations included “summary executions; torture, rape […]
arbitrary arrest and detention, [as well as] restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly,
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religion, and movement.”358 Domestic public opinion started changing as Nigerians began
thinking that “the security services had been merciless in their response to the 2009 uprising.”359
Because of this, President Jonathan was very preoccupied during the first year of his presidency.
As Boko Haram attacks continued, the Nigerian National Assembly signed into law the
Terrorism Preventive Act (TPA) on June 3, 2011.360 The act implemented the Counter Terrorism
Centre (CTC) and:
“Designated the Office of the National Security Adviser as the Coordinating Office for
Nigeria’s Counter terrorism efforts. The Act also gives ONSA the mandates to ‘ensure
the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive Counter Terrorism Strategy and
build capacity for the effective discharge of the functions of relevant security,
intelligence, law enforcement, and military services.’”361
Around this time, President Jonathan also created the position of national counter-terrorism
coordinator.362 Shortly after, on August 26th, Boko Haram boldly attacked the United Nations
headquarters in Abuja with a car bomb, which resulted in 21 deaths and over 73 injuries.363 It is
believed that “Boko Haram wanted to embarrass the Nigerian state in front of an international
audience, signal to foreigners that they [were] now targets, and prove that the military’s
crackdown in the northeast [had] not weakened the movement.”364 Since international entities
were now involved, President Goodluck Jonathan had to make a change. He started looking at

358

United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, April 8, 2011.
359
Thurston 2018, 149.
360
Sneha Bhura, “Can Nigeria's Anti-Terrorism Law Address the Boko Haram Threat?” Institute for
Defense Studies and Analyses, last modified December 2012, https://idsa.in/africatrends/nigeria-antiterrorism-law-address-the-boko-haram-threat_sbhura_1212.
361
Federal Republic of Nigeria, “About CTC,” Office of the National Security Adviser,
http://ctc.gov.ng/about-ctc/.
362
United States Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on
Terrorism 2011, July 31, 2012, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195541.htm.
363
“Death toll revised in Nigeria UN attack,” Al Jazeera, last modified August 28, 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/08/2011828175626971940.html.
364
Alex Thurston, "Nigeria’s Terrorism Problem," Foreign Policy, August 2011,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/26/nigerias-terrorism-problem/.

65
other countries counterterrorism laws to see what Nigeria could learn and potentially
implement.365
The next major administrative change occurred on January 1, 2012366 when President
Goodluck Jonathan declared a six-month state of emergency367 in Borno, Yobe, and Plateau
States.368 Along with this declaration came the temporary closure of the country’s northern
borders, due to the government identifying the area as “transit routes for the movements of arms
and insurgents.”369 This gave President Jonathan “greater authority over northeastern state
governors, several of whom belonged to the opposition.”370 As a result, relationships between
northern governors and the president became tense.371 Some went so far as to accuse Jonathan
and the federal government of “using the insurgency to assassinate critics, intimidate rivals, and
provoke intercommunal conflict in the north.”372 However, the most significant event of 2012
was the Lake Chad Basin Commission’s (Niger, Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad, Libya,373 and the
Central African Republic)374 decision to expand the 1994 mandate of the Multinational Joint
Task Force (MNJTF) to fight against Boko Haram.375 The Task Force consists of Cameroon,
Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Benin and is an “offensive and stabilization mechanism with the
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objective of combating Boko Haram and other groups labeled as terrorists operating around the
Lake Chad Basin.”376 Essentially, it allows members to coordinate actions against Boko Haram,
while underscoring the responsibility of individual nation-states.377 Despite expanding the
mandate, the MNJTF was not operationalized until the African Union’s authorization in 2014.
Towards the end of 2012, international organizations and countries continued to cite
human rights abuses in Nigeria at all levels of government.378 A Human Rights Watch Report
called “Spiraling Violence”379 pointed out the danger in these abuses by arguing that they
implored Boko Haram to continue carrying out attacks.380 This condemnation continued into the
New Year and coincided with another increase in Boko Haram’s lethality.
On April 16-17, 2013, the Joint Task Force, comprised of the Nigerian Army, Air Force,
and police,381 massacred an estimated 220 civilians in Baga, Borno State.382 The massacre
reportedly began after Boko Haram militants fired at military members.383 As a result, the JTF
began “killing suspected Boko Haram sympathizers and destroying homes.”384 Shortly after, on
May 13th, President Jonathan renewed the state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa
States and sent more troops to the Northeast.385 In his justification for the state of emergency,
President Jonathan declared that “some northern parts of Borno State have been taken over by
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groups whose allegiance are to different flags than Nigeria’s”386 and that “no matter what it
takes, we will win this war against terrorism.”387 This was one of the federal government’s first
admissions that Boko Haram held, and was continuing to gain, territory in Nigeria. As a result,
Jonathan ordered the immediate deployment of troops “to those states for more effective internal
security operations.”388
Three months later, in August, the JTF was rebranded as the new Seventh Army
Division, with over 8,000 troops.389 This move by President Jonathan was likely due to the
negative reputation swirling around the JTF and the Baga Massacre. Shortly after, in September,
U.S. President Barack Obama “raised the issue of human rights abuses with President
Jonathan”390 who continued to deny the allegations. Thus, the exchanges between President
Obama and President Jonathan appeared “to have had no effect on the Nigerian Government or
the behavior of the security services.”391 Criticism of the Jonathan administration peaked on
December 12th, when former President Obasanjo released a scathing 18-page letter addressed to
the current president. In the letter, the former President heavily criticized Jonathan’s security
stance on Boko Haram and stated:
“Knowing the genesis of Boko Haram and the reasons for escalation of violence from
that sector with the widespread and ramification of the menace of Boko Haram within
and outside the Nigerian borders, conventional military actions based on standard phases
of military operations alone will not permanently and effectively deal with the issue of
Boko Haram. There are many strands or layers of causes that require different solutions,
approaches or antidotes. Drug, indoctrination, fundamentalism, gun trafficking, hate
culture, human trafficking, money laundering, religion, poverty, unemployment, poor
education, revenge and international terrorism are among factors that have effect on Boko
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Haram. One single prescription cannot cure all these ailments that combine in Boko
Haram.”392
In response, Administration officials stated that “Mr. Obasanjo’s attack was ‘reckless, baseless,
unjustifiable and indecourous,’”393 as well as “highly unbecoming, mischievous and
provocative.”394 Later, officials went so far as to accuse the letter of containing “the most
reckless, baseless, unjustifiable and indecorous charges levied against [Jonathan] and his
administration.”395
The following year, in April of 2014, President Jonathan endorsed the National Counter
Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) for implementation.396 The NACTEST is a “policy framework
for counter-terrorism in Nigeria”397 and articulates, “the nature of the terrorist threat that Nigeria
faces, the response guidelines and mechanism, and the role of stakeholders, as well as
institutions involved in countering terrorism.”398 It’s organized into five work streams: Forestall,
Secure, Identify, Prepare, and Implement.399 Forestall “aims to stop people from becoming
terrorists,” Secure increases “protection capacity against terrorists,” Identify “aims at preemption through detection and early warning,” Prepare tries to mitigate “the impact of terrorist
attacks,” while Implement is the “framework for mobilization of a coordinated crossgovernmental counter-terrorism effort.”400 The creation of the NACTEST was likely due to Boko
Haram’s increasingly sophisticated attacks, which also likely influenced President Jonathan’s to
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renew the state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States the following month.401 This
was done despite opposition from multiple Nigerian organizations, including the Civilian Joint
Task Force.402
As regional security worsened amongst the Lake Chad Basin Commission countries, due
to Boko Haram’s rapid expansion,403 the actual reactivation of the Multinational Joint Task Force
began on October 7, 2014.404 During this meeting, members discussed “modalities for the
deployment of the multinational force and the establishment of the command headquarters to
coordinate its operations.”405 Shortly after, on November 25th, the African Union’s Committee on
Peace and Security (PSC) endorsed the activation of the Multinational Joint Task Force.406
However, it was not until January 29, 2015 that the PSC “formally authorized the deployment of
the MNJTF for a 12-month period”407 with a recommendation of 7,500 personnel408 and an
initial budget requirement of $700 million USD.409 These financial costs were designed to come
from Lake Chad Basin Commission member states with Nigeria (voluntarily) being the biggest
contributor.410 Before delving further, it is important to clarify the role of the African Union in
relation to the Multinational Joint Task Force. The AU is the “principle partner in the
establishment [and efficiency] of the MNJTF [, due to their] experience in the deployment and
401

Campbell 2014, 13.
Thurston 2018: 211. The Civilian Joint Task Force differs from the Joint Task Force in that it is
completely civilian comprised. The bulk of its members are young Muslims from the Northeast that
emerged to counter Boko Haram. Although the group has been criticized for resembling a “vigilante
group,” it is indisputable that their knowledge of local traditions and dynamics bring an element to the
fight against Boko Haram that the Joint Task Force lacks. Zenn, Jacob, “Nigeria’s Civilian Joint Task
Force,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified July 18, 2013, https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigeriascivilian-joint-task-force.
403
Assanvo, 7.
404
Ibid, 6.
405
Ibid.
406
Ibid 2.
407
Ibid.
408
Ibid, 9.
409
Ibid.
410
Ibid.
402

70
management (political administrative and financial) of peace operations.”411 They are tasked
with providing strategic/logistical support and oversight. This includes: coordinating and
managing donor assistance and financial contributions and supplying transport, IT, and other
communications equipment.412 However, in terms of control, Nigeria was unanimously given
control of the entire MNJTF for the duration of its mission, due to its “commitment to eliminate
Boko Haram and its determination to reassert its leadership.”413 Furthermore, “from an
operational perspective, […] Boko Haram was mainly likely to occur on Nigerian territory,
making it judicious for Nigeria to assume this office.”414 In order to better understand the
MNJTF, its institutional structure and key tenets are laid out below:415

Table 5: Institutional Structure of the MNJTF

Dimension

Entity In-Charge

Jurisdiction

Political

Lake Chad Basin
Commission

Operates under the direct authority of the LCBC and
reports on the execution of its mandate.

Strategic/Logistical

African Union

Oversight, including financial contributions,
transport, and IT/communication equipment.

Operational
(Military)

MNJTF headquarters in
N’Djamena, Chad

Consists of personnel from the force-contributing
countries (Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Benin)1
and is led by a Nigerian Commander, Major General
Lamidi Adeosun.

Adapted from Assanvo et.al., “Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force Against Boko Haram,” 2016.
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Table 6: MNJTF Operational Sectors
Sector

Command Location

Sector 1

Mora, Cameroon

Sector 2

Baga-Sola, Chad

Sector 3

Baga, Nigeria

Sector 4

Diffa, Niger

Adapted from Assanvo et.al, “Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force Against Boko Haram,” 2016.

Table 7: MNJTF Divisions
.

Components of the MNJTF

Purpose

Civilian
(Not yet active)

Help the LCBC executive secretary with
political, administrative, and financial aspects,
since he is head of the mission.416

Police
(Not yet active)

Help the military with security.

Military
(Active)1

Deployed to member countries to fight Boko
Haram

Adapted from Assanvo et.al, “Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force Against Boko Haram,” 2016.

Shortly after the African Union’s activation of the MNJTF, President Jonathan again tried to
renew the state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States.417 The House of
Representatives rejected this motion, signifying the beginning of the end for President Jonathan.
The incumbent President ended up losing the 2015 election to General Muhammadu Buhari who
had led Nigeria’s 1983 coup.
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The hardline military approach taken by President Jonathan did more harm than good in
the fight against Boko Haram. First, the increased number of temporary police and military
stations in the North provided Boko Haram with more access to weapons.418 Since security
forces were so preoccupied in the North, these groups became inaccessible to civilians.419 This
likely discouraged civilians from sharing important information about Boko Haram with the
authorities.420 Second, the continuous state of emergency “made civilians more isolated and
vulnerable.”421 Authorities instituted curfews and checkpoints422 and frequently blacked out
telephone communication and media access, making it virtually impossible for people to
communicate with each other.423 As a result, early warning systems were crippled, schools and
markets were closed, farming ceased, major roadways became blocked, displacement and
banditry dramatically increased, and attacks by Boko Haram became so frequent that they
appeared to became an everyday part of life for Northern Nigerians.424 This likely caused an
increase in Boko Haram’s membership since the group could easily draw on anti-government
frustration. Furthermore, President Jonathan’s “lack of political will and his inability to
effectively combat Boko Haram”425 harmed regional and MNJTF relationships, due to Nigeria
being perceived as “an impediment to progress in regional cooperation.”426 The country’s
reputation as a human rights violator furthered harmed this cooperation.
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One explanation for the Jonathan administration’s failure against Boko Haram is the
notion that he “didn’t believe that Boko Haram was a serious issue.”427 Instead, some have
claimed that Jonathan believed that Boko Haram was a “device by the north to prevent him from
continuing as president of Nigeria.”428 In fact, President Jonathan’s wife initially suggested that
the Chibok kidnapping of 2014 “was a fabrication intended to discredit her husband.”429 This
reason, according to former President Obasanjo, explains the remarkable ineffectiveness of the
Jonathan administration; “now if that is the situation, you can understand why the right attention
was not paid to the issue of Boko Haram when it should have been paid.”430
The Buhari Era (May 29, 2015 –Present)
Boko Haram became a major issue in the 2015 election,431 as “voters’ concerns about
security intersected with their anger about economic issues, especially corruption.”432 For this
reason, General Muhammadu Buhari ran his campaign on the promises that he would strengthen
Nigerian security by tackling Boko Haram and addressing widespread corruption in the
government.433 He overwhelmingly defeated incumbent President Jonathan and won “twenty-one
of Nigeria’s thirty-six states, as well as nearly 54% of the vote.”434
Shortly after being elected, President Buhari began making significant changes to the
Nigerian Security Forces, as well as their approach to Boko Haram. First, he replaced the heads
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of the Army, Navy, and Air Force435 and moved the Nigerian Military Command Centre from
Abuja to Maiduguri in May of 2015.436 This decision is thought to have been strategic so that the
military could begin attacking Boko Haram’s logistics routes.437 President Buhari then renamed
the operation against Boko Haram to “‘Operation Lafiya Doly’ – ‘Peace by Force’”438 and
stressed the need to utilize technology like “satellite images and geographical information
system[s].”439 Within his first year in office, President Buhari heavily invested in various
military and security technologies (i.e. drones) and revamped closed-circuit television
(CCTV).440
President Buhari also demonstrated an immediate re-commitment to regional
cooperation, particularly with members of the Multinational Joint Task Force. His first
international trips were to member states of the coalition, which he visited between June 3August 1, 2015. This was a necessary move considering Boko Haram’s increasing attacks on
neighboring states, which demonstrated “the growing regionalization and even
internationalization of the conflict.”441 Fellow members were happy with this recommitment and
described President Buhari as bringing “new impetus to the joint response efforts.”442 In July, the
President began to repair the fractured relationship between Nigeria and the United States, which
had deteriorated under President Jonathan. Prior to meeting with President Obama in
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Washington, D.C., President Buhari wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post, calling on Nigeria’s
allies, including the U.S., to provide military training and intelligence to counter Boko Haram.443
By December of 2015, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Benin had raised the
MNJTF’s personnel to 11,150444 and President Buhari had made security-related visits to the G7,
the United States, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Ghana, India, Iran, and Malta.445 Nigeria’s
commitment to international partnerships was clearer and stronger than ever. However, President
Buhari had a faltering at the end of the month when he claimed technical defeat over Boko
Haram.446 In these remarks, he stated “I think technically we have won the war because people
are going back into their neighborhoods. Boko Haram as an organised fighting force, I assure
you, that we have dealt with.”447 These statements were widely criticized for exaggerating the
military’s successes; “each time the army claims to have wiped out Boko Haram, the militants
quietly rebuilt.”448 Regardless, this feeling of success was short-lived, as attacks continued into
2016, including an attack on a village in Dalori, Nigeria that left over 50 people dead.449
In January of 2016, President Buhari established the North-East Rehabilitation
Committee, led by Theophilus Danjuma, with the aim of rehabilitating infrastructure and
resettling internally displaced persons in the sub-region.450 Also around this time, the Buhari
443
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administration began receiving criticism for their perceived slow response to Boko Haram. In
response, President Buhari stated, “People say we are slow. We are trying to change structures
put in place by our predecessors in office for 16 years. If we hurry it, we will make mistakes.
That will be a disaster.”451 Days later, on the 14th, the African Union’s Committee on Peace and
Security “renewed the MNJTF mandate for an additional 12 months”452 and on the 29th,
President Buhari pledged to commit $100 million USD’s to the MNJTF.453 Months later, in
April, the federal government announced that the military had captured Abu Musab al-Barnawi,
the leader of the Boko Haram faction that had pledged allegiance to Daesh.454 It also introduced
Operation Safe Corridor, which was aimed at rehabilitating and re-integrating repentant Boko
Haram militants.455 The following month, President Buhari raised Nigerian MNJTF personnel
from around 3,750 to 8,500,456 which was likely due to the success of the MNJTF in the prior
months. One indication of this success was that 4,960 Boko Haram hostages were freed by the
coalition in the first five months of 2016.457
On August 23rd, President Buhari revised the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy
(NACTEST) that was implemented under the Jonathan administration. He emphasized a “holistic
approach”458 and “called for multi-sectoral collaboration [where] all government establishments
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would [cue] into NACTEST for maximum achievements.”459 This new strategy was designed to
“involve all stakeholders in the battle by encouraging Nigerians to unite against terror in spite of
their religious, tribal, political leanings.”460 It also stressed the responsibility of religious leaders
“to use their various places of worship to enlighten their followers through a change of mindset
to embrace morality and love of God.”461 Shortly after this announcement, Operation Safe
Corridor reported that it was taking in over 800 Boko Haram fighters for rehabilitation.462
President Buhari finished out the year by working alongside the International Committee of the
Red Cross and the government of Switzerland to negotiate “the release of twenty-one Chibok
schoolgirls.”463
In the first month of 2017, President Buhari left for a short vacation to London. His stay
ended up being prolonged, due to an undisclosed illness.464 Two months later, on March 10th, the
President returned to Nigeria with questions swirling around his still undisclosed illness.465 As
time progressed, President Buhari appeared to be improving and in May, his government even
orchestrated the release of another 82 Chibok girls.466 Although the administration didn’t
publicly detail the terms of the release, several senior officials have gone on record saying that
the negotiations included “the release of five captured [Boko Haram] militants and a total of €3
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million.”467 Immediately after meeting the newly released Chibok girls, President Buhari was
flown back to London on medical leave,468 which lasted until August 21, 2017.469 During the
President’s absence, the country’s economy faced an oil-driven recession and experienced an
increase in Boko Haram suicide attacks.470 In October, two months after returning to Nigeria,
President Buhari went to Turkey to foster a partnership to stop Boko Haram and other insurgent
groups.471 Despite this, attacks continued and on November 21st, Boko Haram attacked mosque
in Adamawa, killing 60.472
Mid-December, Governors from Nigeria’s 36 states and the National Economic
Council473 approved the Buhari Administrations request to take $1 billion USD from the Excess
Crude Oil Account to fight Boko Haram.474 President Buhari believed this money could be used
to purchase equipment, procure intelligence and logistics, and more.475 Towards the end of the
month, the African Union’s Committee on Peace and Security decided to renew the MNJTF’s
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mandate against Boko Haram for another year, starting on January 31, 2018.476 Sadly, the year
ended on a violent note, as Boko Haram carried out Christmas Day attacks in Maiduguri,
Gamboru, and Damboa with an estimated 28 victims.477 Yet, in his 2018 New Years Eve speech,
President Buhari declared that “we have since beaten Boko Haram […] Isolated attacks still
occur, but even the best policed countries cannot prevent determined criminals from committing
terrible acts of terror.”478
So far, President Buhari has been lauded for taking a more “proactive approach than his
predecessor toward countering [Boko Haram],”479 which has led to a dramatic decrease in
deaths. In 2014, Boko Haram was the most dangerous terrorist group in the world.480 In 2015, the
group dropped to second deadliest, behind Daesh.481 Most recently, in 2016, Boko Haram
dropped to the third deadliest terrorist group in the world with 1,079 deaths.482 This was an 80%
decrease in the number of deaths from the previous year, making Nigeria the most improved
state via terrorism.483 The GTI attributes this steep reduction to the success of the MNJTF, as
well internal fractures within the group.484 They also contribute the decline of Boko Haram to a
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significant reduction in the number of terrorism-related deaths in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger,
which collectively recorded a 75% decrease in deaths.485
Despite these successes, there is disagreement over President Buhari’s performance todate. Internationally, President Buhari is perceived to be doing a great job. The following
countries and organizations have publicly commented about the Buhari administration:
1. African Union: In 2018, the AU elected President Buhari as their first ever
“Anti-Corruption Champion” because of his “administration’s commitment
and glowing success in the fight against corruption in Nigeria.”486
2. Equatorial Guinea: In January of 2018, President Mbasago said that “he has
been doing a great job and today we can tell because we all know it that he
has almost eradicated the menace of Boko Haram apart from minor, minor
scourge of insurgencies that are happening from time to time.”487
3. United States: In February of 2017, President Trump thanked President Buhari
for the “good work he is doing, and also commended him for the efforts being
made in rescuing 24 of the Chibok girls and the strides being taken by the
Nigerian military.”488
4. United States and United Kingdom: In 2017, they “praised Nigeria for its
efforts to fight terrorism after country’s security forces foiled a planned Boko
Haram attack”489 on their embassies in Abuja.
Domestically, despite certain elites lauding the Buhari administration (i.e. the Shehu of Borno490
and the leaders in the All Progressives Party491), there is widespread dissatisfaction with the

485

Ibid.
Onyinye Nwachukwu, “AU to inaugurate Buhari as 2018 anti-corruption Champion,” Business Day,
last modified January 24, 2018, https://www.businessdayonline.com/au-inaugurate-buhari-2018-anticorruption-champion/.
487
“President Mbasogo commends Buhari for fighting Boko Haram insurgency to standstill,” Vanguard,
last modified January 23, 2018, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/01/president-mbasogo-commendsbuhari-fighting-boko-haram-insurgency-standstill/.
488
Levinus Nwabughiogu, “Trump invites Buhari to Washington, promises new military deal against
Boko Haram,” Vanguard, last modified February 13, 2017,
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/02/trump-speaks-buhari-promises-new-military-deal-boko-haram/.
489
Ludovica Iaccino, “U.S. and U.K. Praise Nigeria for Foiling Boko Haram Plot to Attack Embassies,”
Newsweek, last modified April 12, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/boko-haram-embassies-attackabuja-583046.
490
Nan, “Shehu of Borno lauds Buhari’s success against Boko Haram insurgency,” The Guardian, last
modified December 31, 2017, https://guardian.ng/news/shehu-of-borno-lauds-buharis-success-againstboko-haram-insurgency/.
486

81
President’s performance. This is particularly evident in the approval rating of President Buhari.
In 2015, his overall rating was 67%.492 This number dropped to 44% in 2016,493 as people
became angry at the worsening economy and the President’s secrecy surrounding his illness.
However, when asked specifically about Boko Haram, public opinion had increased
dramatically; 61% felt the government was doing enough to combat terrorism.494 After a brief
increase in April of 2017, to 55%,495 President Buhari finished 2017 with an overall approval
rating of 45%.496 He was rated highest in the areas of food security and security, but the lowest in
job creation and poverty.497 Two reasons for this drop in approval are the unchecked youth
unemployment epidemic and the increasingly deadly conflict between Fulani herdsmen and
farmers.498 Certain groups have been vocal about their dissatisfaction of job unemployment,
particularly The National President of the Yorubas Youth Congress (YYC) and the Northern
Youth Coalition. The YYC released a statement saying that the President was perpetuating youth
unemployment by pushing youths to the backside and taking them for granted.499 The Northern
Youth Coalition has advised the President not to seek re-election stating “the victory record in
the fight against Boko Haram was insufficient to campaign with as insecurity had worsened in
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other areas with kidnapping and ethnic violence on the rise.”500 The final explanation for the
drop in approval involves former President Obasanjo, who released a scathing letter detailing the
failures of the Buhari administration and the All Progressives Congress. However, in terms of
security and corruption, President Obasanjo stated, “I thought President Buhari would fight
corruption and insurgency and he must be given some credit for his achievement so far in these
two areas although it is not yet uhuru!”501 However, the former President believed that by solely
focusing on Boko Haram, President Buhari neglected the crisis between the Fulani herdsmen and
farmers.502 In response, the Minister of Information and Culture, Alhahi Lai Mohammed,503
issued a lengthy reply to each of the claims put forth in the former President’s letter. Part of the
press release read:
“…we have no reason to believe that former President Obasanjo has any motive beyond
the well-being of the nation in issuing his Special Press Statement. We have also taken
his admonition in good faith, and we thank him most sincerely for taking time off his
busy schedule to pen such a long statement.”504
By calmly acknowledging President Obasanjo’s claims, as opposed to unilaterally writing them
all off as President Jonathan had done, President Buhari was able to avoid further conflict
surrounding the issue.
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This section focuses on the international actors and organizations that have been the most
active, as well as vocal, in the fight against Boko Haram. They have been organized
alphabetically.
African Union (AU)
The response, help, and coordination provided by the African Union to the Lake Chad
Basin countries have been invaluable. Thus, out of all the international actors, the African Union
has been the most critical, useful, and effective in its response to Boko Haram. Because of how
integral the AU has been in this fight, and how influential it has been to the domestic response of
Nigeria, this entity was referenced heavily in the domestic response section, as opposed to the
international response section.
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) is a regional economic community
that works with “numerous regional and international organizations with the purpose of
consolidating collective work in the political, cultural, economic, and social fields.”505 The block
has 24 members, including almost all of North and West Africa,506 as well as some East African
countries (i.e. Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea),507 and includes almost all of the countries
heavily affected by Boko Haram.508 As of 2016, the group had “disbursed $1.5 million to three
member states (Niger, Chad, and Benin) to enhance the welfare of their troops with respect to
[the] regional counter-terrorism undertaking.”509
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The European Union (EU)
In May of 2014, the EU designated Boko Haram as a terrorist organization.510 Over two
years later, in July of 2016, the group announced 58.2 million euros in humanitarian aid to
countries that were affected by Boko Haram,511 as well as 145 million euros to the Sahel
Region,512 totaling 203 million euros in aid.513 The following year, on September 15th, the EU
donated 50 million euros to the Multinational Joint Task Force.514 However, this money did have
stipulations and was not meant to cover the “procurement of weaponry or military equipment,
but instead meant to meet its logistical and material needs and cover a part of its human
resources.”515 These resources and materials include air transport, secured communications,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and more.516
France
France has played more of an indirect role in the fight against Boko Haram and made it
clear in 2015 that they did “not intend to take part in the fighting.”517 Instead, the French
government provided “intelligence and military support to the Nigerian Army”518 and “sent 40
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military advisers to Niger’s southern border with Nigeria to help coordinate [MNJTF] military
action.”519 Two years later, the French gave 14.5 million euros in humanitarian aid to the Lake
Chad Basin region to deal with food insecurity, IDP’s, and refugees.”520 Since 2015, the French
have donated over 30 million euros.521
Israel
After the Chibok kidnapping, Israel dispatched counterterrorism experts and aid to assist
in finding the girls.522 A year later, the United States blocked the sale of U.S. helicopters by
Israel to Nigeria,523 claiming that it was routine to make sure that these sales were in the U.S.’s
interests.524 While this is true, it is likely that the U.S. was not keen on selling military equipment
to the Jonathan administration, which was shrouded in human rights violations. Months later, in
April, Israel pledged to help Nigeria fight corruption and Boko Haram. The Prime Minister
stated that, “the latest news regarding the Boko Haram-ISIS alliance underscores the need for
like-minded countries to unite in the fight against such radical terrorist organizations.”525
Multiple countries
After the Chibok schoolgirl kidnapping, “the UK, working with the US and France,
provided a range of military and intelligence support to the Nigerian Government in their search
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for the missing girls and their efforts to address the longer term challenge of terrorism.”526 These
countries, as well as many more, also took part in the notorious #BringBackOurGirls twitter
hashtag, which began trending on social media shortly after the Chibok kidnapping. This
campaign helped bring international notoriety to Boko Haram and was used by famous
individuals around the globe, including First Lady Michelle Obama.527
The United Kingdom (UK)
Since the Chibok kidnapping, the UK has “significantly increased [their] military,
intelligence and development support to Nigeria, including training and advice on counterinsurgency.”528 In 2015, the UK upped British Forces from 125 to 300 to provide training and act
in an advisory role.529 The following year, they provided an estimated five million pounds for the
MNJTF, as well as humanitarian support (i.e. “water, sanitation, emergency healthcare”).530
They also worked with Nigeria’s Safe Schools Initiative to provide school materials for
displaced children.531 More recently, in August of 2017, they provided $259 million dollars in a
five-year emergency assistance package,532 while also encouraging Nigeria to ”step up and do
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more” against Boko Haram.533 By the end of 2017, the UK had “provided military training to
28,000 Nigerian troops […and deployed] over 40 UK military personnel [long-term].534
The United Nations (UN)
Shortly after the Chibok kidnapping in 2014, the UN added Boko Haram to the “list of
Al-Qaida associates subject to financial sanctions and an arms embargo.”535 The following year,
the UN commended Lake Chad Basin member states, and Benin, for their operationalization of
the Multinational Joint Task force.536 In the beginning of 2017, the UN was dealing with four
countries around the globe that were at risk or in famine (South Sudan, Northeast Nigeria,
Somalia, and Yemen).537 To end these crises, the UN called on member states to donate $1.5
billion dollars in humanitarian aid.538 This effort was incredibly successful and in August of
2017, South Sudan’s famine had ended and Northeast Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen had all
averted famine.539
However, the biggest step taken by the UN to-date occurred on March 31, 2017. On this
day, the UN adopted its first resolution addressing Boko Haram.540 This resolution, Resolution
2349, condemned Boko Haram and Daesh’s presence and “encouraged Governments to enhance
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regional military cooperation, and to move ‘vigorously and decisively’ to cut funding flows.”541
It also encouraged governments to implement consistent policies aimed at de-radicalization and
reintegration, which offered “no impunity for those responsible for terrorist attacks.”542
Furthermore it advocated for increased protection for humanitarian organizations that deliver aid.
The passing of this resolution was seen as a “‘step change’ in mobilizing support for countries to
combat Boko Haram”543 and has been lauded as being “the first of its kind”544 in recognizing the
efforts of the MNJTF.
Yet, despite the United Nations aforementioned successes, millions of Northeast
Nigerians are still at risk of famine545 and 8.5 million are dependent on humanitarian
assistance.546 More humanitarian aid is necessary to remedy this situation, however the delivery
of such is incredibly difficult, due to Boko Haram’s strategic position in the Northeast.
The United States (U.S.)
The United States became involved in fighting Boko Haram after the Chibok kidnapping
of 2014 and began sending military supplies after President Goodluck Jonathan left office. After,
the U.S. pledged $5 million in support547 and announced that it would be sending an “estimated
300 troops, along with surveillance drones, to Cameroon to assist in regional counter-Boko
Haram effort.”548 In January of 2016, the U.S. donated more military equipment to the Nigerian
Army. Specifically, they gave Nigeria 24 used mine-resistant armored vehicles (worth $11
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million)549 and announced that eight more were on the way (worth $7.4 million).550 Later that
year, the administration pledged $40 million in humanitarian assistance to the sub region.551 The
following year, President Trump finalized a deal created by the Obama administration to sell
Nigeria 12 Tocano fighter jets.552 However, in January of 2018, Nigeria rejected this sale due to
its conditions, which forbid the planes from being sold before 2020 and stated that “Nigerian
technicians [would] not be trained by U.S. staff, or be part of the maintenance crews.”553
Conclusion
As previously stated, the purpose of this chapter was to detail domestic and international
responses to Boko Haram. After analyzing these responses, some common trends emerge.
Domestically, there has been a decades-long failure to adequately address the systemic
causes of the Boko Haram insurgency. By prioritizing a military-heavy response, the federal
government has ignored the root causes of the insurgency. No matter how strong a military
response may be or how effective it is, if problems such as youth unemployment, food insecurity,
and the North/South disparity, continue to loom large, than the problem of Boko Haram will
never truly go away. Furthermore, the Nigerian Government continuously underestimated the
persistence of Boko Haram, which further motivated the group.
Internationally, the countries listed above became concerned with Boko Haram after the
Chibok kidnapping of 2014. This heinous crime compelled them to act, first with military
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personnel and technology and then through financial aid. This shift in assistance can be
attributed to the international community’s realization that the Nigerian Government was going
to have to take the lead in fighting the insurgency. This scaling back of response was
characterized by unfulfilled promises of funding and other forms of assistance. In the coming
years, it will be interesting to see if the promised aid does in fact come through to Nigeria.
The findings and common trends detailed above will be utilized to put forth sustainable
and effective policy solutions aimed at countering Boko Haram. These recommendations are
detailed in the following chapter and will be directed towards Nigeria and the international
community.
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Chapter 4: Recommendations and Conclusions
Based on the findings of prior chapters, recommendations have been crafted for the
Nigerian Government and the international community on how to improve their response to
Boko Haram. These findings ultimately aim to quell Boko Haram and promote peaceful
reconciliation in Nigeria. The recommendations below have taken into consideration Boko
Haram’s roots (i.e. Nigeria’s weak state capacity, due to colonialism and poor-post-colonial
governance, the politicization of religion, and its relationship with other terrorist organizations),
strategies, (i.e. suicide bombings and the kidnapping of school-aged girls), and funding
mechanisms (i.e. other terrorist organizations and political allies). This chapter will conclude
with final thoughts about the entirety of this thesis, the longevity of Boko Haram, as well as
future research questions that should be considered.
Domestic Recommendations
1. Keep Operation Safe Corridor, but address its shortcomings.
To reiterate, the purpose of Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) is to “undertake
deradicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration [DRR] of repentant Boko Haram
members.”554 In order for this program to be truly effective, the federal government needs
to alter its approach to the program in three overarching ways.
First, the reintegration aspect of the DRR must be structured to ensure success for
rehabilitated ex-combatants. This aspect is not only the “most important and complex
aspect of the DRR Programme,”555 but is “the most challenging aspect of dealing with the
aftermath of the Boko Haram insurgency.”556 Because successful reintegration diminishes
554
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the likelihood of recidivism, the federal government must work closely with states to
figure out the logistical aspects of reintegration post-OSC, such as where ex-combatants
will live. One way to deal with these crucial aspects is to create a loose framework that
details the potential challenges that states will likely face as OSC increases its
reintegration efforts. This would make it easier on states, especially those who are likely
to have larger populations of ex-combatants. This framework could be created through a
statewide conference with political representatives from all 36 states.
Second, the federal government must not ignore the concerns that survivors and
communities have about reintegration. If these concerns are not adequately addressed,
then this will remain a barrier to successful reintegration. This is because without
community acceptance, or tolerance, former combatants may re-radicalize. Furthermore,
in order to counteract the stigmatization that many citizens feel towards ex-combatants,
the issue of accountability (justice)557 must be addressed. It is imperative to discuss
accountability, since there is a lack of consensus as to what justice looks like with regards
to Boko Haram. Some differing perceptions of this concept are displayed below.558
Table 8: Perspectives of Accountability (Justice)
Accountability

Rationale

Through prosecution of Boko Haram members

If members aren’t prosecuted, they are being given
the easy way out.

Of the military

The military and the Civilian Joint Task Force must
be held accountable to human rights violations that
they have committed.

Of Boko Haram members and the military

All parties should be held accountable.

Through reparations and monetary compensation

Victims should receive compensation, regardless of
the perpetrator (i.e. Boko Haram, the military, or the
government).
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Through truth

According to survivors

Want the disclosing of “what actually happened,
who Boko Haram is, who their sponsors are, why
the state allowed the crises to fester until now, and
other questions.”559
“A balance must be struck between the rights of
survivors and those of perpetrators.”560

Adapted from the United States Institute of Peace Special Report: Engaging Religion and Religious Actors in
Countering Violent Extremism

To address these concerns, the federal government could perhaps bring in an entity like
Fambul Tok International. Fambul Tok is an INGO based out of Sierra Leone that was
created as a space “for effective community led and owned reconciliation processes
leading to development and sustainable peace in post-conflict countries.”561
Third, the federal government must be more open about OSC with citizens. The
program “is itself challenged on the basis that there is no clear communication to the
public as to whether it is an amnesty program or under what legislation the Nigerian
Government established it.”562 This lack of information can lead to civilian frustration,
especially if they are expected to openly accept former combatants back into society,
without any true knowledge of what the government has done to rehabilitate them.
In terms of overall benefits, if the OSC Program is successful, former Boko
Haram militants could be matriculated and contribute to society. These people would not
only further stimulate the economy, but could also serve as staunch advocates against
extremism. By heeding the above suggestions, the federal government would be taking a
holistic approach towards reintegration, which would diminish the likelihood for further
conflict. Notable difficulties to this approach would be three-fold: 1) there is no way of
knowing whether OSC is going to be successful, 2) it would be near impossible to track
each individual graduate of OSC to make sure that they do not recidivate, and 3) OSC
does not encompass former Boko Haram abductees. These victims, usually young girls,
may be stigmatized upon their return from captivity, similar to the way ex-combatants
559
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are. Thus, the federal government should create a new program that helps these victims
and aids them in their return to normalcy. This program should have a communitycentered approach that aims to educate civilians about the experiences of abductees,
while facilitating reunification and providing an avenue for survivors to continue their
disrupted education. Due to the difficult nature of this program, the government may seek
to partner with NGO’s to ensure the program’s success.
2. Make the MNJTF permanent.
Due to the massive success of the MNJTF in reducing Boko Haram attacks in
Nigeria, as well as neighboring Cameroon, Niger, Benin, and Chad, the regional force
should be made permanent. The most efficient way for this to happen is by making the
group part of The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG)563 within the next two years. By institutionalizing the force, it would prevent
a power vacuum from being created with the sudden pullout of troops and would create a
sub-regional force within ECOMOG that could deal with immediate security concerns in
a stronger and more timely way. Furthermore, this would bring Boko Haram closer to a
military defeat, while assisting in the liberation of local communities held captive by the
group. Once this occurs, the involved countries could ease into post-conflict
reconstruction. However, it must be noted that this approach would require a prolonged
monetary and personnel commitment from the countries involved, particularly Nigeria,
who provides the most support to the MNJTF in terms of funding and troops.
3. Rebuild trust between security forces and civilians.
To give the military credit, “it has had to adapt to a new type of war and learn on the
job.”564 However, this does not justify violations of human rights. Thus, the federal
government would need to unilaterally condemn and prosecute past human rights
violations by Nigerian Security Forces and make it clear that the penalties for committing
such crimes are severe. This would mean taking seriously the accusations against the
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Civilian Joint Task Force, who have been accused of raping women and girls565 and
recruiting young children,566 and prosecuting those who extrajudicially killed Muhammad
Yusuf in 2009.567 This process should be modeled after South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.568
Another way to further trust between the two would be to train the Nigerian Military
on the local customs of the area that they are deployed to, since citizens may perceive
them as foreigners who are occupying their territory. Without an understanding of local
culture, it will be incredibly difficult for Nigerian Security Forces to gain “the
cooperation or trust of locals.”569 This trust is imperative because trust in security forces
is an extension of civilian trust in government. Without this trust, security forces may end
up actually serving as further incentives for radicalization.
By rebuilding trust, the federal government could create an atmosphere where citizens
feel comfortable sharing intelligence. This could “prevent youth from following the lure
of extremism,”570 thwart future Boko Haram attacks, and prevent members from hiding in
localities. It would also undermine Boko Haram’s influence on citizens by showing
civilians that the federal government is not against them. However, if the federal
government did make this a priority and started calling out shortcomings in the security
forces, then it is possible that some people could defect and become radicalized.
Furthermore, governments are not keen on recognizing their own shortcomings, so some
may see this as unrealistic.
4. Address the underlying systemic causes of the insurgency.
As mentioned in previous chapters, if there is to be any hope in remedying the Boko
Haram insurgency, the systemic causes of the group must be addressed. In other words,
565
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the insurgency “is a political issue; it is a social issue; it is an economic issue; and until
these issues are addressed, the military can never give you a solution.”571 The issues that
the federal government should prioritize addressing are poverty, marginalization,
unemployment, and the disparities between the North and the South.
Northern Nigeria, which occupies around 70% of landmass in the country,572 has the
highest poverty, illiteracy, inequality, and food insecurity rates in all of Nigeria.573 Since
civilian frustration with the federal government is utilized by Boko Haram to recruit, it
must be curbed. Related to poverty is the notion of corruption, which President Buhari
has fought against during his time as president. President Buhari, as well as the winner of
the 2019 election, must continue to fight against institutional corruption, which also
serves as a source of radicalization.
Regarding marginalization, the Nigerian Government, whether by choice or by
accident, has neglected and ostracized certain groups in the country. The worst affected
are Northerners, women, local leaders, and youth.574 This discrepancy is best explained in
terms of women’s political representation in the National Assembly, where only 9 out of
109 Senators and 27 out of 360 Representatives are women.575 This must change, since it
is widely agreed that the political representation of women is “fundamental to democracy
and essential to the achievement of sustainable development and peace.”576 It also tends
to lead to better policies, which foster inclusivity and the responsible allocation of
resources.577 In this scenario, Nigeria should look to countries like Senegal, who not only
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have high female political participation and representation,578 but also have large Muslim
populations.579 Doing so would allow the Nigerian Government to dispel Boko Haram’s
claims that female political participation and education are against Islam.580 Therefore, in
order to counteract this marginalization, the state must push for increased participation
and representation of the aforementioned groups in all levels of government, particularly
at the federal level. Furthermore, in order to actually counteract marginalization, the
government would need to actually listen, respond, and work with disgruntled Nigerians
to address their concerns and grievances.
In terms of unemployment, youth unemployment must be a particular focus of the
federal government. This is because, as of 2010, the country had a “youth population of
80 million, representing 60% of the total population of the country.”581 Of those 80
million, 64 million were unemployed, while 1.6 million were under-employed.582 This
statistic is incredibly troubling, particularly because unemployed youth are Boko
Haram’s biggest base for recruitment. Thus, to counteract the lack of opportunities that
exist for northern youth, it is critical that jobs be created. People must be able to support
themselves, whether it be through sustainable agriculture job initiatives or microfinance
initiatives designed to stimulate economic growth. The government must invest in these
opportunities in the North and not just focus on oil exporting jobs that are concentrated in
the Southern portion of the country. The private sector, both domestic and international,
has a role to play in this struggle as well and must invest more in the North. However, in
order for private companies to be attracted to this area of Nigeria, the government must
eradicate corruption and kleptocracy so that investors desire to work there. Lastly, in
terms of secondary education, students must be better trained with employable skills that
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can be utilized across a multitude of sectors. This would ensure that students are not
dependent on one job for their well-being.
Finally, the Nigerian Government must address and eliminate the disparities between
the North and the South. The disparities that must be focused on include water access,
infrastructure, and electricity. These are basic necessities and can be improved with
domestic partnerships (i.e. NGO’s and state and local governments), as well as
international partnerships (i.e. INGO’s and the international community). Nigeria can
also reach out to its continental allies and see how they have, or currently are, addressing
similar problems in their own countries.
Overall, this approach could quell resentment towards the federal government,
prevent people from joining and aiding Boko Haram, and lead to defections from the
group. By addressing the systemic issues of the uprising, Boko Haram’s legitimacy will
be tarnished and they will not be able to use the government’s lack of care as a
propaganda mechanism. In addition, the likelihood of other groups arising in the future
with the same ideology would be dramatically reduced. However, due to the nature of the
problems detailed above, this is by far the most comprehensive and difficult solution to
the Boko Haram insurgency. It would involve addressing nearly all of the federal
government’s shortcomings and would require immense research and intricate policy
initiatives, which would involve an enormous amount of time and money.
5. Increase the role of religious leaders and actors in countering extremism.
Religious leaders are important in any society due to their “unique positions of
authority, the credibility that they often hold within their respective communities, their
ties to their community members, and their access to and knowledge of institutional
resources.”583 The Nigerian Government should reach out to religious leaders and “listen
more than it speaks.”584 By hearing what these individuals have to say, it “would serve
the dual purpose of changing the image of the state as corrupt and unresponsive, and
simultaneously creating channels of information that might help prevent the emergence
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of further Boko Haram-like movements.”585 However, they must keep three things in
mind when reaching out to religious actors: don’t just speak to people that agree with
their policies,586 don’t just speak to leaders with “credentials,”587 and don’t call on
religious leaders to “neutralize” religion or political mobilization.588
If the government wants to keep its credibility throughout this process, it must fight
against the common interpretation of credibility, which encompasses “religious figures
who articulate views that are aligned with official government policy, or who refrain
from directly criticizing political leaders.”589 A religious actor with true credibility is
likely to be someone “who combines an erudite critique of a violent extremist group’s
religious justification with another of injustices arising from the policies of governments
targeted by those groups.”590 Related to credibility are the credentials of religious leaders.
Contrary to popular belief, educational and theological credentials are not always
indicative of someone with communal respect and knowledge. In actuality, “religious
leaders at the local and provincial level are likely to be more trusted and to have a more
granular understanding of the specific issue facing their communities.”591 Additionally,
religious actors should not be encouraged to neutralize religion, but instead channel a
person’s desire for change into something positive and societally beneficial.
Other recommendations for the Nigerian Government include increasing inclusivity
when reaching out to religious actors, resorting to religious leaders preemptively, not just
reactively, and increasing trust and communication with religious actors. In terms of
inclusivity, the government must involve religious representatives in the process of
developing “and implementing new strategies and guidelines [to counter violent
extremism]”592 For the most effective results, it is imperative that “traditional and
nontraditional religious actors, [especially] women and youth,” be involved, so policies
can take “into account the multiple identities and roles of different religious actors.”593
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By acknowledging that religious actors should “be involved at all levels in efforts to
counter violent extremism,”594 more comprehensive policies could be created. Thus,
“policymakers should first consult with religious actors and other grassroots access and
insight to hear about and understand their needs before new policies are even created.”595
By drawing on the roles of religious actors as “mediators and counselors”596 in their
communities, more sustainable policies could be created that cater to the specific region,
area, and religion that the policy will affect. Finally, increasing communication and trust
between the government and religious actors would “mitigate risk[s] and improve
effectiveness around issues such as returnee reintegration and rehabilitation or addressing
the psychosocial needs of a community.”597
The benefits of this approach would be the de-legitimation of the politicization of
religion by extremist groups, which would lessen the power of religion as a mobilizing
force. This solution is also sustainable, unlike a primarily military approach, and would
be able to fight against future extremism. The downsides are logistical and security
related. The way that the federal government would decide who to engage would be time
consuming and require an innovative approach to counter violent extremism.
Furthermore, there are security risks for the religious leaders and actors that do become
involved, as they could become targets of extremists.
6. Learn from past mistakes.
For decades, the Nigerian Government’s “approach has been of saying the right
things but at the wrong time, or of doing the right things but in the wrong way.”598 For
example, like President Jonathan did in 2014, President Buhari initially denied the recent
attack in Dapchi, where it is believed that one of the Boko Haram factions kidnapped
over 100 schoolgirls.599 Another mistake was the sudden pull out of troops from Dapchi,
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a week prior to the kidnapping.600 The Governor of Dapchi heavily criticized this move,
citing an instance in 2013, which had a similar result.601
In order to avoid these mistakes in the future, the government must learn how to
better listen to civilians and continue treating Boko Haram as a holistic problem. In terms
of listening to civilians, they need to pay more attention to the specific programs that
civilians are calling for, as well as how they are responding to already enacted programs
and initiatives. From these accounts, the government could then create new programs or
modify existing ones. In terms of a holistic approach, just as the Buhari administration
has tried to do, the winner of the 2019 election must not focus its attention on a solely
military defeat of Boko Haram. A holistic, multilateral approach to countering violent
extremism should be enshrined in Nigeria’s security policy towards all current and future
insurgent groups.
By focusing on past mistakes, the federal government could better prevent future
terrorist incidents and learn about their own faults, which they may not be aware of.
However, because of this introspection, the federal government may not look at this
solution very favorably.
Although there is merit to each of the above recommendations, the most critical involve
addressing the systemic causes of the insurgency, rebuilding trust between security forces and
civilians, bringing in religious leaders to fight counter-extremism, and rehabilitating former
militants and survivors. If these four recommendations are not implemented, and are not done
within the next 3-5 years, the likelihood of Boko Haram, or an ideologically similar group,
regaining followers and power will tremendously increase. Thus, in the worst case, the power
struggle between Boko Haram and the federal government could become permanent.

600

Soni Daniel, “Withdrawal of troops caused Dapchi girls abduction – Governor,” Vanguard, last
modified February 25, 2018, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/02/withdrawal-troops-caused-dapchigirls-abduction-governor/.
601
Ibid.

102
International Recommendations
1. Continue to support the MNJTF.
The international community must continue to support the MNJTF through funding,
words, and actions (i.e. selling military equipment). In terms of funding, the Community
of Sahel-Saharan States, the African Union, the United States, the United Nations, the
United Kingdom, the European Union, and France must continue their support for the
Lake Chad Basin countries, since, per the above domestic recommendations, Nigeria will
be diverting some funds towards internal improvements to counter Boko Haram. China
should also step up in this fight, due to its strong diplomatic ties to the continent, and
provide funding to the MNJTF. Regarding words, countries that do not supply funding
should continue their unilateral condemnation of Boko Haram, especially when largescale attacks occur. Lastly, countries should continue giving Nigeria and the MNJTF
military supplies, so long as they are carrying through with, and focusing on, holistic
solutions to the crisis. This will provide pressure on the Lake Chad Basin countries to
holistically address Boko Haram, which should diminish its overall longevity.
2. Continue to comment on human rights violations.
Just as they have done in the past, the international community must be sure that
human rights are not being violated in the countries plagued by Boko Haram, whether on
purpose or by accident. NGO’s and INGO’s can also help in this monitoring, specifically
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, who have spoken out on such
violations in the past. By doing so, the chance of security force violations occurring, such
as extrajudicial killings, are less likely. The Lake Chad Basin countries should welcome
this accountability, as it could disincentive radicalization.
3. Pay attention to what has and hasn’t worked in the fight against Boko Haram.
The countries specified above, as well as those plagued by terrorism, should be
paying attention to what approaches have and have not been successful against Boko
Haram, so they can make modifications to their own counterterrorism strategies. By
doing so, other terrorist groups, like Daesh, may be defeated quicker and groups that have
not yet risen to power may be thwarted before becoming full-blown insurgencies.
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4. Monitor communications between Boko Haram and its affiliate groups.
The international community, particularly those with strong intelligence networks like
the United States, should work together with the Lake Chad Basin countries to be sure
that Boko Haram does not regain its strength through interactions with other terrorist
organizations. This monitoring would include watching weapon and money transfers.
The most critical recommendations for the international community involve supporting
the MNJTF and monitoring communications between Boko Haram and other insurgent groups.
In terms of support, financial assistance should continue until the defeat of Boko Haram. If the
MNJTF were to become institutionalized into ECOMOG, as proposed in the above solution, then
the international community would have to figure out the most effective way to continue
supporting the group. This could be done through regional organizations, such as the European
Union, world organizations, such as the United Nations, or through individual countries.
Regarding monitoring, this should continue long after Boko Haram’s defeat to ensure that other
insurgent groups don’t spring up in its absence.
Final Thoughts
The above recommendations were crafted based on the findings of this thesis and other
scholarly research. If implemented, these recommendations would be a tremendous asset in the
fight against Boko Haram. While some solutions are more long-term than short-term, the pay-off
would be seen for decades to come, which is why it is this author’s hope that they will be taken
seriously.
To reiterate the findings of this thesis, the Boko Haram insurgency, which arose in 2002
and turned militant in 2009 after the death of its leader, can be attributed to three factors. These
three factors are Nigeria’s weak state capacity, due to colonialism and poor post-colonial
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governance, the politicization of religion, and Boko Haram’s relationship with other terrorist
organizations, specifically Al-Shabab, Al-Qaeda, and Daesh. Due to the deadly nature of the
group and the massive suffering that they have inflicted on the Nigerian people, as well as those
in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, Boko Haram warrants studying. The response of the Nigerian
Government has been plagued by inefficiency and the continued failure to address the systemic
causes of the insurgency. Instead, prior to the Buhari administration, emphasis was placed on a
military solution, which cannot fully eradicate Boko Haram. For true change to occur, the
underlying causes of the insurgency, including youth unemployment, food insecurity, poverty,
and the disparities between Northern and Southern Nigeria, must be addressed. Internationally,
countries have provided aid and weapons to the Multinational Joint Task Force and should
continue to do so, as long as they are not violating human rights of civilians and militants.
While tremendous success has been achieved so far against Boko Haram, it is this
author’s belief that Boko Haram’s longevity is dependent on three factors: the 2019 election,
whether or not the systemic causes of the group are addressed, and Nigeria’s long-term
commitment to the group. Regarding the 2019 election, it is clear that Boko Haram will be a
main issue. While it is currently unknown as to whether President Buhari will seek a second
term, it is imperative for the winner of the election to continue viewing Boko Haram as a priority
to the national security and peace of Nigeria. If the next president views the problem as
secondary and decides to focus on other internal matters, even though they may be pressing, this
would be disastrous. Giving Boko Haram time to regroup and reassert itself as a dominant power
would be the worst thing that the Nigerian Government could possible do. Furthermore, whoever
decides to campaign for the presidency must be cautious not to lead people towards
radicalization. In other words, candidates must caution themselves against politicizing religion,
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which, as noted earlier, is one of the drivers of violent extremism. Moving on to the systemic
causes of the insurgency, if Nigeria hopes to put an end to Boko Haram and other extremist
groups, then they must prioritize institutional and societal change. There is simply no way to end
Boko Haram without addressing these crucial issues. Thus, they should become major issues in
the 2019 election and President Buhari should work harder to try and tackle some of these issues
(even with minor improvements) before exiting office. Finally, the disparities between the North
and the South must be remedied in order to thwart future terrorist organizations from rising in the
future and to improve Nigerian unity. The modern divisions that exist within Nigeria lead to
violence and the blaming of entire ethnic groups and regions. This is detrimental to the
effectiveness of the federal government’s efforts to fight Boko Haram and should not be
overlooked. If these issues are not addressed, then it is this author’s fear that Boko Haram will
regain strength and continue to exist for decades to come.
While this thesis aimed to answer many of the questions surrounding the Boko Haram
insurgency, many remain unanswered and should be undertaken in future research. One such
question involves the internal structure of Boko Haram. Specifically, more information is needed
regarding the fracturing of the group, its leadership, and the communication of the different
factions, particularly in terms of other terrorist organizations. Another question that arises
surrounds the relationship between Nigerian political elites and Boko Haram. Since the role of
political elites in the group’s rise is unclear, this topic must be studied. Finally, the effectiveness
of Operation Safe Corridor should be studied, and policy changes should be made accordingly. If
there is notable success, the federal government may want to make the program the priority for
captured fighters. Furthermore, if positive results are being seen, then other international actors
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may want to draw on Nigeria’s reintegration and reconciliation framework to address current
extremist groups and thwart future ones from rising.
With partnerships, perseverance, and massive changes, Boko Haram can and will be
defeated. Until then, Nigeria and its partners must keep fighting against this evil for the sake of
their citizens. Only then, will the evil of Boko Haram be eradicated and sustainable peace be
truly achieved.
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